By Stan Oyunga (email@example.com)
After the requiem Mass for former First Lady Lucy Kibaki held last Wednesday at Consolata Shrine in Westlands, President Uhuru Kenyatta appeared to spend a few minutes talking with Wiper Party leader Kalonzo Musyoka. One may not read much into this but in the on-going coalition building for the 2017 General Elections it may be a sign of warming of relations between the two leaders who had a serious falling out in 2012, leading to Kalonzo joining forces with CORD for the 2013 elections. Raila Odinga was just standing nearby but Uhuru appeared to have no time for him.
If Jubilee wants to win the 2017 elections without a run-off, then it will have no option but to turn east to the Kamba ethnic group that occupies lower Eastern Region but has as a sizable population in Nairobi and the Coast. This ethnic group is expected to have almost 2 million potential voters in 2017 (see my blog “Road to 2017: The game of numbers”) and is a principal partner in CORD but cracks are starting to appear in the Coalition, as last week Raila thrashed the MOU he signed with Kalonzo in 2013, that assured that Raila would be a one term President should CORD win in 2013.
Wiper has had a frosty relationship with Jubilee ever since attempts by Kalonzo to endear himself to Uhuru and Ruto just after they were indicted by the ICC in The Hague in 2011, failed. A remark Kalonzo made in Mosop in Nandi County in 2012 that seemed to suggest he will be available just in case both Uhuru and Ruto are jailed by the ICC, appeared to annoy them and Kalonzo was no longer welcomed. This re-buff drove Kalonzo into the hands of Raila leading to the formation of CORD in 2012. The Kambas have never forgiven Uhuru and Ruto for the mistreatment of Kalonzo and even bringing Charity Ngilu’s National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) into Jubilee in 2013 (after a brief dalliance with CORD) did not add any significant numbers to Jubilee’s vote tally in Ukambani. Uhuru received only 89,064 in Kitui, Machakos and Makueni compared to Raila’s 768,025.
There appears to be strategy by Jubilee to win Kamba voters by using Machakos Governor Alfred Mutua, who has an immaculate development record, as an alternative to Kalonzo and there is a growing movement called the Maendeleo Chap Chap in Ukambani which may end up as a political party. But this strategy may backfire as Kambas are unlikely to abandon Kalonzo especially after the treatment they have received from their Central Region “cousins”. Why go for the “Tail” when you can eat the whole animal?
Hence in order to win re-election in 2017, Uhuru and Ruto will have to make peace and make a deal with Kalonzo that will guarantee him a significant post in the Jubilee coalition in 2017. One possible arrangement is that Kalonzo becomes Ruto’s running mate in the 2022 Elections (one heart-beat from the Presidency), meanwhile he or one of his party members can become Speaker of the National Assembly (3rd in line in succession) or Majority Leader (equivalent to Prime Minister) in the 12th Parliament in 2017. Kalonzo can only end up as a running mate once again for Raila Odinga in CORD in 2017 (with no guarantee of winning). If Wiper pulls out of CORD and joins Jubilee, then CORD will have little chance of winning the 2017 elections.
The loss of Wiper will reduce CORD’s projected voters in 2017 to 8.8 million compared to Jubilee plus Wiper’s 10.5 million, a variance of 2.7 million. Hence Jubilee can afford to lose the entire Luhya block votes in 2017 as long as they have the Kamba votes. The significant Kamba votes in Nairobi and the Coast will increase the Jubilee vote tally in both Regions.
As Uhuru prepares to tour the Lower Eastern Region to give out “goodies” watch the body language between Uhuru and Kalonzo.
5th MAY, 2016
© 2016 STAN OYUNGA
By Stan Oyunga (firstname.lastname@example.org)
In modern warfare, Generals remain at their Headquarters, while majors and lieutenants lead the troops into battle. The reason for this is not only to protect the General from harm but also to ensure an effective command structure with overview of the battle remains in place.
For the second time in as many weeks, CORD principal and ODM party leader and his supporters were today tear-gassed in front of the IEBC offices at Anniversary Towers in Nairobi. They were taking part in country-wide demonstrations which were called by CORD to force the IEBC Commissioners out of office, despite a High Court order barring the demonstrations.
The fact that Raila Odinga personally led the demonstration to attempt to evict the Commissioners despite the massive presence of Anti-Riot police with the latest anti-riot vehicles, shows he was ready for battle. The videos of the CORD leaders scampering for safety into their cars is widely playing on TV and social media, begging the question what had been achieved by moving to occupy the IEBC HQ?
Would a political rally at Uhuru Park be more effective rather then attempting something which can end in injuries or even loss of life? CORD leaders know that public opinion can turn against them if people are injured, killed and property damaged on a cause that can be achieved by legal means.
Negative ethnicity is slowly rearing its ugly head going by comments in social media, something Kenya cannot afford to go through following the 2007/2008 post-election violence. CORD leaders are vulnerable to injury in this type of demos and going by Raila’s age (71) he should avoid inhaling tear-gas and be in physical confrontation with the authorities, especially when what you are doing is against the law.
Raila should also think of his personal security especially, when his police security have been told not to protect him during such demos. There is an enemy who will take advantage of the chaos provided by these demos to harm him and other CORD leaders and then blame the Government. The country will then burn for the second time in less than ten years.
If Raila is as popular as he thinks, then he does not need to worry who is in charge of the IEBC, and can still win the 2017 Presidential elections as long as he has a 80% registration and 80% turn-out in his strongholds and CORD remains intact. He should actually get out of the trench and get CORD’s 10 million potential voters to register and then vote. The very IEBC he wants disbanded is the one carrying out this voter registration with only 15 months to the elections.
By Stan Oyunga (email@example.com)
Raila Odinga’s quest to be elected Kenya’s fifth president in 2017 may have suffered a blow by two events in a span of forty-eight hours. On Thursday, 31st, March, 2016, some ODM Members of Parliament and Senators interrupted President Uhuru’s “State of the Nation” annual address to a joint session of the National Assembly and the Senate. Loud whistling among parliamentarians, forced the President to stop and let the National Assembly Speaker take over. Speaker Justin Muturi was forced to throw out Ugunja MP Opiyo Wandayi out of the chambers for interrupting the President’s speech for up to thirty minutes. Others ordered out were ODM national chairman John Mbadi, Ruaraka MP T. J. Kajwang, Homa Bay woman representative Gladys Wanga. Homa Bay Senator Moses Kajwang, Mbita MP Millie Odhiambo, Nyando MP Fred Outa and Dagoretti North MP Simba Arati.
The next day, Cord leader Raila Odinga appeared to support his ODM parliamentarians by likening the whistling in Parliament “to a cockerel crowing to mark a new morning”. Speaking at a meeting with Meru professionals, politicians, traders and elders in Nairobi, Raila blamed the disruptions on National Assembly Speaker Justin Muturi’s conduct. “The whistles meant it was sunrise and Kenyans should wake up,” he said. “The Speaker is personally responsible for what happened. It wasn’t right to treat MPs like criminals.” (The Star-2-4-2016).
The next day, Saturday, 2nd April, 2016, in Kakamega, CORD principle and FORD-Kenya party leader Moses Watangula’s 2017 Presidential launch rally was interrupted by a teargas canister thrown by person towards the main dais. Although the function continued, several people were injured in the melee. CORD principal and Wiper Party leader Kalonzo Musyoka was also present but it was the absence of CORD leader Raila Odinga that raised eye-brows. Although Raila was expected to attend the function, clashes between ODM and FORD-K supporter earlier in the day may have led Railia to skip the function due to security fears and he then left Kisumu for a private visit to Tanzania. The event was marred by chaos after Kakamega Senator Bonny Khalwale’s and Governor Wycliffe Oparanya’s supporters clashed, leading to the eviction of ODM supporters, who support Oparanya, from the venue by FORD-K supporters who support Khalwale, (who wants to challenge for the Kakamega gubernatorial seat in 2017). Surprisingly, Oparanya did not attend the function in Muliro Gardens which was turned into a FORD-K affair.
The two incidents may not be connected but they laid bare the fact that Raila Odinga gets poor political advice if he is serious in challenging not only Uhuru Kenyatta in 2017 but also be the CORD flag bearer. These incidents came only a week after the Okoa Kenya initiative sponsored by CORD failed to reach the one million registered voter threshold. If CORD was really serious in protesting Uhuru’s State of the Nation speech to Parliament, a more effective way would be a boycott of the sitting or a mass walkout by the Opposition as soon as the President started his address. The blowing of whistles by only a handful of ODM parliamentarians was not only childish but appeared to be ethnic based. In fact most of the parliamentarians were from Homa Bay County. It seems the other opposition parliamentarians, including most from ODM were not in agreement to disrupt the President’s speech.
The impression Kenyans got was that the protest against Uhuru was in bad taste and ethnically based, as the Presidency is an institution that deserves respect and the State of the Nation speech is anchored in the very same constitution the parliamentarians swore to defend. Were other opposition parties in the CORD coalition consulted before the plot to disrupt the speech was hatched? According an article in the Sunday Nation of 3rd April, 2016, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Justin Muturi, stated “Some CORD MPs who did not believe in what they were being asked to do, came to my office to notify me of the impending disruption……some were saying if Tinga (Raila’s nickname) were the President today, we would not like it if he was subjected to such kind of humiliation.” The article goes on to claim that the “ODM secretariat facilitated the purchase of more than 100 whistles, which were distributed among willing CORD MPs”.
Raila’s defense of his parliamentarians was a blunder as he knew they were breaking the standing order that states the President’s speech must be heard in silence. If Raila becomes President, am sure he will expect to be given the same respect that his parliamentarians were denying Uhuru. Raila should have instead issued a rebuttal to the President’s speech from a formal setting as the opposition does in the United States immediately after the US President’s State of the Union speech each year.
Just forty eight hours later, Raila failed to attend Watangula’s Presidential launch rally in Kakamega or even send apologies. The snub has led to bad blood between ODM and FORD-K and now threatens the CORD coalition unity in the run up to the 2017 General Elections. Although the security situation in Kakamega may have led to cancellation of Raila’s attendance, his appearance would have sent a strong message to Kenyans that CORD stands united. Raila has braved many situations which could be termed as dangerous, including being “caned” in Kwale and the falling dais in Malindi just a few weeks ago, so even a teargas attack would not be termed as a threat to his life. There was no injuries to those on the podium and the function went ahead without further incident.
The ODM and FORD-K supremacy battle in Kakamega is just part of the Bukusu and Maragoli (the largest and second largest sub-ethnic group of the Luhya) rivalry that was there since the re-emergence of multi-party politics in 1992. The Luhyas are now the second largest ethnic group in Kenya after the Kikuyu, hence present the second largest voting block, but except in 2002, have never voted as a block in Presidential Elections. In 1992, they voted for both President Daniel arap Moi of KANU (the winner) and Kenneth Matiba of FORD-Asili (who came second). In 1997, they voted for both President Moi (the winner) and Michael Kijana Wamalwa of FORD-Kenya (who finished fourth). In 2002, the Luhya for the first time voted as a single block for Mwai Kibaki of NARC (the winner), who had agreed to appointment Wamalwa (as Vice-President) and for the first time in history, voted out a sitting Vice-President, Musalia Mudavadi of KANU (who lost his Sabatia seat). In 2007, The Luhya vote was split with the Bukusu sub-ethnic group of Bungoma voting for Kibaki of PNU (the winner), hence giving him 32 % of Western Province and the Maragoli and other sub-ethnic groups voting for Odinga of ODM (who finished second), giving him 66 %. Again, they made history for the second election running by rejecting a sitting Vice-President, with Moody Awori of PNU losing his Funyula seat.
In 2013, a dispute within the ODM resulted in a breakaway candidate, this time Musalia Mudavadi, was sponsored by the United Democratic Front (UDF) after falling out with the ODM, where he had been Raila Odinga’s deputy. Hence the CORD coalition was depending on the Luhya, Luo, Kamba, Kisii and Mijikenda ethnic block votes. Since Mudavadi came from the Maragoli, the second largest sub-ethnic group of the Luhya, it had the effect of splitting the Luhya ethnic block vote, which was the second largest in Kenya after the Kikuyu. Mudavadi’s candidature resulted in the split of the Luhya ethnic vote, with most Maragolis who dominated Vihiga and Kakamega County, voting for Mudavadi, but he won only in Vihiga and came second in Kakamega, Bungoma and Busia.
As things stand now the Luhya, despite having the second largest voting block (estimated at 2.6 million) are finding themselves split between Raila’s ODM (popular in Busia and part of Kakamega counties), Wetangula’s FORD-Kenya (popular in Bungoma, Trans-Nzoia and part of Kakamega), Ken Lusaka’s New Ford Kenya (NFK) (popular in Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia) and Musalia Mudavadi’s Amani National Congress (ANC) (popular in Vihiga and Kakamega). While ODM and FORD-K are in the CORD coalition, New Ford Kenya is in the Jubilee coalition and the ANC is currently not affiliated to any coalition. The battle for the elusive dream of a single Luhya Presidential candidate for 2017 is now between Wetangula and Mudavadi, but even with their huge voting block, the Luhya cannot win a Presidential elections on their own hence again have to make deals in 2017 to remain in CORD, join with Jubilee or the new Amani National Congress. New Ford Kenya (NFK) is among the Jubilee Coalition affiliated parties that were due to merge into a single Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP) by April, 2016, but due to legal and political reasons the merger has been put off until further notice.
If FORD-Kenya decides to pull out of the CORD coalition, it could end up joining the Jubilee Coalition only if the latter remains a coalition as it would be unlikely that FORD-K can agree to merge with JAP and then dissolve. The Jubilee Coalition draws most of its support from the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Meru ethnic groups and may not win the 2017 Presidential Elections unless the CORD coalition either breaks up or fails to register enough voters and and/or they fail to turn-up to vote in large numbers as they did in 2013. Jubilee will need to re-build bridges with the Luhya ethnic group which depends on the sugar industry for their economic lifeline and also revive the Webuye Pan-Paper Mills.
Both the Bukusu (FORD-Kenya and New Ford Kenya) and Maragoli (Amani National Congress) sub-ethnic groups will account for 1 million of the estimated 2.6 million Luyha voters in 2017 and reside in Bungoma, Kakamega, Vihiga and Trans-Nzoia counties. A pre-election coalition deal may have to be signed that guarantees the Western parties certain posts and share of cabinet/parastatals/diplomatic posts. Jubilee may have to guarantee Wetangula one of two powerful posts in Kenya: Speaker of the National Assembly (3rd in line in succession for the Presidency under the constitution) or Leader of the Majority in the National Assembly. The Luhyas will expect to be given the Deputy President slot in 2022, in case Ruto goes for the Presidency, hence Wetangula may be tempted by this prospect, since there is no guarantee that if Raila wins in 2017, he will not go for a second term and Kalonzo of Wiper may be Raila’s running mate in 2017 and in 2022.
The Western parties will never agree to dissolve and join JAP in order to increase their bargaining power within the Jubilee Coalition. The Samia sub-ethnic group and the Teso ethnic group of Busia County may remain in CORD but they account for a small part of the Western voters (372,000 estimated voters in 2017). If Jubilee can wrest at least half of the Western Region voters from CORD, then its estimated voters will be 9.9 million against CORD’s 9.4 million, a variance of only 500,000 but enough to win.
What happens if the Luhya leave the CORD Coalition and presents its own Presidential candidate in 2017 who is expected to be Moses Watengula, knowing well they cannot win outright but to deny CORD the Presidency? The purpose of this would be to sign a post-election coalition with the Jubilee Coalition if it wins the 2017 elections. This is similar to what Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya’s deal with the Party of National Unity in January 2008, when Kalonzo Musyoka was appointed Vice-President in order to support Mwai Kibaki’s weak government following the disputed 2007 Presidential elections. CORD rump (minus Western Region) will have 7.9 estimated voters, Jubilee 9 million (a variance of 1 million) and Western only 2.3 million. This option shows CORD cannot win without the Western Region votes and this will most benefit Jubilee but they may prefer a pre-election coalition agreement to breakup CORD. If Jubilee can reach a pre-election agreement then a Jubilee/Western Coalition will have 11.4 million estimated voters, which will exceed CORD rump by a massive 3.4 million voters.
The fact remains that Raila Odinga cannot be President without the support of FORD-Kenya and the Luhya. CORD’s vote will be farther eroded if Mudavadi of ANC goes ahead with his “lone ranger” candidacy.
5th April, 2016
© 2016 STAN OYUNGA
DISCLAIMER: THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ARE PURELY THOSE OF THE AUTHOR OF THIS BLOG. THE KENYA ELECTION DATABASE IS A NON-PARTISAN WEBSITE AND IS NOT AFFILIATED
By Hillary Ang’awa (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Just imagine arriving to vote in the 2013 General Elections and you were the only registered voter at that polling station. No waiting in line for 8 hours to vote as they had to in some polling stations in Nairobi County, you had your own presiding officer, his deputy, poll clerks, election agents and security officers to protect you, all who have been waiting for your arrival since 6 a.m.
You walk in, you are identified using the Electronic Voter Identification System (EVID) kit or the manual register, are issued with ballot papers, mark them and place them in the respective ballot boxes, then your little finger is marked with indelible ink and it is all over within ten minutes. The polling station staff can now relax as they do not expect any other voters since the only registered voter at this polling station has voted and left. They will simply wait for the official closing time of 5 p.m. before unsealing the ballot boxes and start counting the single ballot papers placed in each by the single voter.
The above scenario may have not taken place in the 4th March 2013 General Elections, and the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) may have merged polling stations with few registered voters, but the fact still remains that there were five officially gazetted polling stations with only ONE registered voter. There were also 7 polling stations with only 2 registered voters each, 2 with only 3 voters and 6 with 4 voters each.
The twenty polling stations with less than 4 registered voters each were among the 24,560 gazetted as polling stations under gazette notice no 1454 (Vol CXV no 15) dated 1st February, 2013. The IEBC’s own report on “Voter register statistics per polling station” found on their website (www.iebc.or.ke) gives number of voters for each polling station (see table below):-
[table id=55 /]
What if the above polling stations were in fact in operation on 4th March, 2013 and the single voter was expected to turn up and vote? It should be interesting to know and how much it cost to set up a single voter polling station and staff and equipment deployed to run it.
On the other side of the coin, there were 41 polling stations with over 10,000 registered voters in 2013 General Elections, all in Nairobi County except 8. Umoja 1 Primary School (polling station no 286/001) in Embakasi West Constituency has the most registered voters in Kenya, with 29,244 (30 streams), followed by Mulolongo Primary School (no 080/040) in Mavoko Constituency with 22,048 (23 streams) and St Monica Primary School (no 185/016) in Kajiado East Constituency with 21,248 (22 streams), as shown in the table below:-
[table id=56 /]
Please note that the IEBC uses the constituency code and a 3 digit serial number to identify polling stations in Kenya, e.g. Umoja 1 Primary School’s polling station no is 286/001 since it is in Embakasi West constituency (no 286) and the first to be listed (001). Although it is in Umoja 1 Ward (no 1426) and the only polling station in this ward the next polling station Busara Primary School (002) is in Umoja II ward (no 1427) and is identified as polling station no 286/002 and is one of four in this ward (allocated nos 286/002-286/005). Hence the Ward number does not feature in the polling station identification number. This allows the IEBC to close, merge, open or transfer a polling station to another ward within a constituency without affecting the numbering system.
The Kenya Election Database version 2.1, an Election Data Analysis and Strategic Election Planning software is currently the only software that has details of the 24,560 polling stations and which of the 1,450 wards they fall, the number of registered voters (can be updated), number of streams and average number of voters per stream. A voter can elect to register at a polling station with fewer voters especially in Nairobi County to avoid long queues on polling day.
The county with the most polling stations is Kitui with 1,318 followed by Meru (951), Kakamega (904), Nakuru (899), Machakos (875), Makueni (862), Baringo (855), Homa Bay (816), Bungoma (804), Kisii (748), hence counties perceived to be CORD strongholds have the most polling stations in the top ten, as shown in the table below:-
[table id=57 /]
Lamu County has the fewest polling stations in Kenya with 120 followed by Isiolo (144), Mombasa (196), Tana River (243) and Garissa (262). Nairobi has 330 polling stations and is ranked 35th but has the highest number of streams 2,228. Streams are equivalent to mini-polling stations (each with its own EVID, ballot boxes and staff), hence there are 31,979 streams in the country hence Kenya can be said to currently have 31,979 polling stations.POLLING-STATIONS-COUNTY-SUMMARY.xls (330 downloads)
13th March, 2016
©2016 KENYA ELECTION DATABASE
By Hillary Ang’awa (email@example.com)
The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) is lamenting the poor response to its Voter Registration exercise from 15th February to 15th March, 2016. By end of the third week only 868,073 voters has been registered out of a target of 4 million (21%).
The IEBC is blaming politicians for not doing enough to recruit the very voters they will need to win both the primary and General Elections in 2017. Despite pleas by the coalition and party leaders, why is there such a poor response to voter registration so far. Even the last minute surge (a supposedly Kenyan habit) may not occur this time.
Since this was a mass voter registration targeting new voters and those who wished to change their polling stations and Ward/Constituency, and another one is to be undertaken in February, 2017, there was no urgency and IEBC can expect to net no more than 5 million out of its target of 8 million.
In order to find a possible answer, the Kenya Election Database looked at Kenya’s demographic data. According to the 2009 population census, there were 7.2 million Kenyans aged 11-18 out of which 3.4 million would have reached the age of 18 by 2012 and able to register as voters. But due to the low number of voters registered by December, 2012 (14.3 million out of target of 18 million), it seems most were not registered. Since the IEBC does not give the voter’s age when registering, it not possible to know the exact number.
It is estimated that about 3.8 million Kenyans who were in the age group 12 to 15 in 2009, would turn 18 to 22 during 2016 hence liable to be issued with identity cards but were too young to be registered in 2012. It is this age group that needed to be targeted for the 2016 mass registration and the best people to help and encourage the recruitment of this age group would be their parents or guardians. Most will still be in secondary school, or just starting tertiary education hence still under the care of the parents or guardians. Due to mortality and other factors, only 80% of the 3.8 million (3 million) can be expected to register.
In 2017, the Kenyans who were 11 years old in 2009 (842,590) will have turned 19, hence liable to be issued with identity cards and registered as voters in the 2nd mass registration in February, 2017. Thus the total potential voters in the 11 to 15 age group in 2009 and who will be 19 to 23 years of age will be 4,732,070 but due to mortality and other factors the number would be 3.8 million.
This age group is what the IEBC should target and appeal to parents/guardians to ask their children/wards to come forward and register as voters as part of their constitutional rights. Mobile Polling stations should be set up in tertiary institutions to register the students as voters. Most Kenyans in the 18 to 23 year age group still stay with their parents or are in close touch with them.
The delay to issue identity cards and/or collecting the same has an impact in number of persons to be registered. The IEBC can co-ordinate with the National Registration Bureau to ensure that issuance of National Identity cards is speeded up and the NRB publish a list of uncollected identity cards on its website, print media and an SMS alert when the card is ready.
The table below shows the voting age group based on the 2009 census:-
[table id=54 /]
By adding the 3.8 million potential voters who did not register in 2013 to the 2 million who were in the 20 to 22 age group in 2013 hence were qualified to register in 2012 but most did not do so, you have 5.8 million potential voters in the 18 to 25 age group in 2016. (CORD and JUBILEE take note).
IEBC just has to ask their parents to help through the media. After all they will know if they have registered as voters and convince then to do so if they have not (most still live in the nest). Remember this is the “Generation Z” who were born after 1995 and are very tech savvy. They are now on Whats App and Instagram while their parents are still on Facebook, Twitter or SMS. They expect their “paros” to vote on their behalf and do not expect to see them lining for up to 8 hours on polling day. If there has to be a real generational change in Kenyan politics then the “Generation Z” can make that change by registering and voting in 2017.
May be voting should be made compulsory in Kenya…………….
13th March, 2016
© 2016 KENYA ELECTION DATABASE
By Stan Oyunga (firstname.lastname@example.org)
In exactly one and a half years from now (8th August 2017), Kenyans would have re-elected Uhuru Kenyatta for a second term as President or would have shown him the door and made history as the first country in East Africa to have replaced an incumbent President; or the leading Presidential candidate would have failed to garner the 50% +1 figure required to be declared elected and Kenyans would be preparing for a run-off presidential election for the first time.
IS FORMATION OF JUBILEE PARTY A BLUNDER?
The move by the Jubilee Coalition to dissolve its constituent parties by April, 2016 may be a blunder as although the Political Parties Act (Section 11 (7)) allows sitting MPs, Senators, Women Reps in the National Assembly and Members of County Assemblies (MCA) whose parties have merged with another to join the new party or become an independent member without losing their seats for the remainder of their term, it remains silent on the President, Deputy President, and Governors. Any attempt to amend the Political Parties Act to include the President and his Deputy will be seen as contravening Section 136 of the Constitution and also sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Electoral Act, 2011.
The framers of the Constitution did not contemplate a sitting President and his Deputy changing political parties before the expiry of their respective terms and such a change can only take place under section 13 and 14 of the Electoral Act. The dissolution of both The National Party (TNA) and the United Republican Party (URP) before the expiry of the term of both holders will lead Kenya into a constitutional crisis and a legal minefield.
THE SUPREME COURT FACTOR
The fact that the Supreme Court of Kenya is the only court that can determine any application that touches on matters of the interpretation and application of the Constitution, (under section 163 (a)). Hence any legal body may challenge the dissolution of the President’s party as unconstitutional. The fact is the Supreme Court is currently in a crisis, with a senior judge under investigation due to corruption, and the fate of the Deputy President of the Court is still unresolved due to issue of her age. Under section 163 (2) the quorum required is five which cuts it very thin to render a unanimous ruling, where one may be needed as a court of last resort.
When party nominations are held for the 2017 General Elections, the losers may decide to look for other parties to nominate them to enable them to take part in the General Elections, or they may stand as independent candidates. In some cases this will lead to the strange situation of a party under CORD or another coalition having a seat in a Jubilee Party stronghold. This actually happened in the 2013 General Elections when the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) won in Igembe Central and Tigania East, hence were counted as being under CORD despite being in a Jubilee Coalition stronghold. Areas such as Nairobi, Nakuru and Eldoret will see former TNA and URP aspirants in direct competition in party elections in the new Jubilee Party and also for nominations in the primary elections, prior to the General Elections.
Formation of the Jubilee Party will make it difficult to have other major parties outside the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups join the Jubilee Coalition as they will first have to dissolve their parties (e.g. in Luhya, Kisii, Kamba and Coastal areas), a move that will make them lose their identity. Moving from a pre-election coalition to a single political party has no advantage for Uhuru Kenyatta as he seeks to be re-elected. On the contrary, it may be very risky due to the nature of coalition politics in Kenya. He needs to attract other parties (often de facto ethnic groups) to his coalition as he depends mainly on his Kikuyu ethnic group, Meru and Ruto’s Kalenjin ethnic group. Uhuru should retain Jubilee as a pre-election coalition in order to attract other parties as Kenyans tend to identify with their ethnic groups especially in voting patterns. This the reality of Kenya Politics.
Section 10 of the Political Parties Act requires Coalitions to deposit their agreements 3 months prior to a General Election or 21 days after signing such an agreement after a General Election. Dissolving political parties in the Jubilee Coalition and merging them with the Jubilee Party before April, 2016 may render the pre-election coalition agreement null and void and Jubilee may lose its status as the majority coalition under section 108 of the Constitution. Alternatively, the opposition may go the Supreme Court to challenge Jubilee’s right to be the majority coalition.
THE NARC DREAM
The reason for a party to “unite Kenyans” does not hold water as Kenya has been down this path before. The nearest that Kenya came to having such a party in the multi-party era was the National Rainbow Coalition or NARC, in 2002 which was formed to end KANU’s 40 year reign as Kenya’s ruling party. The party originated from Charity Ngilu’s National Party of Kenya (NPK) in 1997 but did not sponsor any candidates in the 1997 General Elections. It transformed itself into the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK), a coalition of 13 political parties formed in September, 2002 in order to contest the General Election as one party. On 22/10/2002 it joined forces with the Liberal Democratic Party (Rainbow), which comprised of former KANU politicians, to form the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) with Mwai Kibaki as its presidential candidate. Political parties that joined forces to form NAK were the Democratic Party, Ford-Kenya, Social Democratic Party, National Party of Kenya, SPARK, United Democratic Movement, Ford-Asili, Conservative Party of Kenya, Shirikisho, Federal Party of Kenya, Kenda, Liberal Green Party and the Progressive People’s Forum.
NAK transformed itself into the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) to enable the latter to sponsor candidates for the 2002 General Elections held on 27th December, 2002 which was won by NARC. This tactic was employed to prevent the KANU government from refusing to register NARC as a political party. However, by the time of the 2007 elections, the NARC dream of a united Kenya party was history.
Jubilee’s “Tyranny of Numbers” only exists in the National Assembly due to the large number of new constituencies created in the Rift Valley and North-Eastern Regions, but whose population is low. It does not translate into a huge voter base. Jubilee has no choice but to remain a coalition and embark on luring part of Western, Coast and the lower Eastern regions into its fold if it wants to win re-election in 2017.
Uhuru should spend the last full year of his term building his legacy by means of the completion of the Standard Gauge Railway, the Greenfield Airport terminal at JKIA, the Lamu Seaport and transport corridor, the school laptop project and electrification; and reducing the terrorist threat to Kenya. But he is about to enter a legal minefield due to poor advice and which will turn out to be a distraction.
The possible loss of both Kericho senatorial and the Malindi parliamentary by-elections by the Jubilee Alliance Party on March 7th 2016 would be a wake-up call for Uhuru Kenyatta to drop plans of merging Jubilee coalition parties.
9th February, 2016
© 2016 STAN OYUNGA
DISCLAIMER: The views are solely those of the author of this blog and do not reflect the views of the Kenya Election Database website, which is non-partisan and is not affiliated to any political party, coalition or organization.
BY STAN OYUNGA (email@example.com)
Kenya voters are well known for exercising their democratic rights every five years and sending their sitting MPs home and electing completely new faces. In 2002 they even sent the then ruling party packing and electing a new Government for the first time in Kenya’s post-independence history. They almost repeated the feat in 2007 but due to the disputed election results, ended with the Grand Coalition Government. They have twice sacked a sitting vice-president and several Cabinet ministers in the past, although Cabinet ministers no longer have to be members of Parliament since 2013.
Using the Kenya Election Database version 2.0, the only Election Data Analysis and Strategic Election Planning software on Kenya Elections, it can now be revealed just how many incumbents have lost since 1969 and how many new comers have won, as shown on the table below:
[table id=51 /]
NB: INCUMBENTS IN 1969 IS BASED ON THOSE WHO WERE ELECTED MPs IN 1963 & DOES NOT INCLUDE THOSE ELECTED IN 1966 (LITTLE GENERAL ELECTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT BY-ELECTIONS).
The attrition rate for incumbent MPs in Kenya since 1969 is 32% that is a sitting MP has a 32% chance of not returning to parliament. On new comers (first time MPs) the success rate since 1969 is 38% that is they have a 38% chance of winning a seat on their very first attempt.
2007 remains the worst year for incumbents when a massive 117 (56%) were rejected by voters followed by 1974 and 1979 when 64 (41%) were rejected. 2013 was the best year for incumbents when only 46 (16%) were rejected but this was because 57 incumbents chose to stand in the newly created post of governor and senatorial seats. Out of 22 incumbents (sitting MPs in 2007) that stood in the 2013 gubernatorial election only 9 won while 35 incumbents standing in the 2013 senatorial election, 18 won, hence only 27 out of the 57 making it (47.36%).
On new comers (first time MPs), 1969 remains the best year with 113 (72%) winning who were not MPs in 1963 followed by 2013 with 147 (51%) being elected on their very first attempt. This was because some incumbent MPs in 2007 chose not to defend their seats in 2013 as explained above.
The following table shows how many MPs were incumbents during each election year, how many lost and how many won and total incumbents plus percentage of total MPs standing in that election.
[table id=52 /]
2007 had the highest number of incumbents standing, 189 out of 210 seats (90%) followed by 1983, with 142 out of 158 seats (90%).
As explained above, 2013, had the lowest number of incumbents standing with only 115 out of 290 seats (40%).
Hence from 1969 to 2013, an average of 70% of MPs who stood in Parliamentary elections were defending their seats with just under half not making it back.
The Kenya Election Database also shows performance by former candidates (those who had stood in previous election but never won) and also former winners (those who had won previously and were standing again) and women candidates. These reports are unique to the Database and are not found anywhere else.
©2016 STAN OYUNGA
DISCLAIMER: The views are solely those of the author of this blog and do not reflect the views of the Kenya Election Database website, which is non-partisan and is not affiliated to any political party, coalition or organization.
By Stan Oyunga (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Ever since Kenya started conducting contested Presidential elections in 1992, allegations of vote rigging have surfaced in four of the five Presidential elections held so far. The 2013 Presidential election was the first in Kenya’s history to be challenged by an election petition filed by one of the losing candidate citing irregularities, while the 2007 election was followed by post-election violence that resulted in the deaths of 1,133 people, due to alleged rigging out of one of the candidates.
“Vote rigging” in most elections is equated with ballot box stuffing, where pre-marked ballot papers for a particular candidate are stuffed into ballot boxes either in advance of or after the polling ends when transporting the ballot boxes to a vote counting centre. When the electoral law was changed from the 2002 elections to provide vote counting at polling stations and also use of transparent/opaque ballot boxes, the incidents of vote stuffing was greatly reduced.
Another form of rigging is vote tallying fraud where the results on the official form (Form 16A) are altered in favour of a certain candidate within the National Tallying Centre. An unusual incident in 2007 was the delay in receiving Presidential election results from several constituency in the greater Meru District, a stronghold of President Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU). Despite the election regulation stating that the Presidential ballot papers be counted first, some returning officers at polling stations chose to count and announce Parliamentary results first. At this time Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) was leading in the vote tallying, but as results for Meru District started filtering in, his lead decreased until he had been overtaken by Mwai Kibaki. Some of these officers decided to travel all the way to Nairobi to deliver their certified election results, (Form 16A), instead of relaying the provisional results by phone as instructed. They made sure their mobile phones were switched off so that even the ECK Chairman, the late Samuel Kivuitu could not contact them.
By the time the defunct Election Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced the results of the 2007 Presidential elections on 30th December, 2007, declaring Kibaki the winner, riots and violence had already started in parts of the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Nairobi, resulting in Kenya’s worst political crisis since independence in 1963.
In order not to repeat the mistakes of the 2007 elections, the voter tallying was automated, with results being transmitted in real time to the National Tallying Centre at Bomas of Kenya in Nairobi using the Results Transmission System (RTS). But due to several factors whether by omission or commission, the system failed and the Independent Election and Boundaries Commission resorted to manual vote tallying, hence leading to the results being challenged in the Supreme Court.
In order to confirm if there could be have rigging in past Presidential elections since 1992, whether by ballot vote stuffing or vote tallying fraud, I used the Kenya Election Database version 2.0, an Election Data Analysis and Strategic Election Planning software. Kenya had been holding “combi” elections from 1992 to 2007 where Presidential, Parliamentary and Local elections were held simultaneously (so called “three piece suite”). After the enactment of the new constitution in 2010, which introduced the devolution with County Governments, hence new elective seats viz, Senators, Governors, Women Representatives and Members of County Assembly Wards. The 2013 General Elections were the first to be held under the new constitution and were in fact six elections in one.
In order to establish if there was ballot box stuffing or vote tallying fraud, I compared valid votes cast for both Presidential elections and Parliamentary elections and noticed a huge difference in 1992, 1997 and 2007 that could only be explained as either ballot vote stuffing and/or vote tallying fraud in these years. In “Combi” elections from 1992 to 2007, registered voters were given three sets of ballot papers for Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government elections and were expected to cast for all three elections in separate ballot box. A voter cannot request to be issued with only Presidential or only Parliamentary ballot papers or decline to accept a ballot paper once it has been issued to him. He cannot also decline to place any in its respective ballot box although he can decline to mark it (spoilt ballot).
Under the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, Cap 7 (now repealed), Regulations sec 29 (4), it is an offence for any person to fail to place a ballot paper issued to him in a ballot box before leaving a polling station and would be liable to a fine not exceeding Kshs 20,000/= or six months imprisonment or both. After repealing of the above Act, its replacement, the Election Act, 2011, made it an offence to take out a ballot paper out of a polling station or to be found in possession of the same outside of a polling station (section 58(7)), which attracts a fine of not exceeding Kshs 1 million, or imprisonment not exceeding six years or both.
Hence it would be unlikely for voters to fail to mark ballot papers issued to them by election officials then fail to place them in the respective ballot boxes and simply walk out with them without an election official or candidate agents being aware. It would even be more unlikely that difference can be explained as spoilt ballot papers due to the large number and that spoilt ballot papers must be accounted for.
In 1992 the difference between the valid votes cast in the Presidential and Parliamentary elections was a massive 574,097, the highest of any election in Kenya’s history, followed by 1997 with 366,993, then 2007 with 165,361 and 2013 with only 30,991. The 2002 General Election was the only one where the number of Parliamentary valid votes cast exceeded the Presidential one, by 23,574. In fact 2002 is still considered the best organized General elections in Kenya’s history, as per table below:-
[table id=50 /]
From the above figures, one can conclude that the 1992 and 1997 Presidential elections, when KANU’s Daniel arap Moi, the incumbent won re-election against a divided opposition, may have been rigged in favour of Moi. In 2007, the Presidential elections may also have been rigged in favour of PNU’s Mwai Kibaki. The defunct ECK has never accounted for the missing ballot papers from the parliamentary elections in 1992, 1997 and 2007. In 2007 only 31,335 Presidential valid votes in Kilgoris (const no 141) were counted since the Parliamentary elections in this constituency were cancelled by the ECK due to violence in the tallying centre. The Parliamentary elections were repeated in 2008. The above table proves that the 2013 Presidential elections was not rigged but failure of the automated Results Transmission System (RTS) raised a lot of suspicion but was never proved in the petition filed by Raila Odinga of ODM. The new constitution provides that a winning candidate must garner 50% plus one vote of all votes cast, a figure which Uhuru Kenyatta of The National Alliance (TNA) just managed to achieve with just over 8,000 votes, in order to avoid a run-off election.
In order to evaluate the constituency breakdown of valid vote difference between Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2013 I have prepared five Excel spreadsheets from data extracted from the Kenya Election Database:-
REPORT-9A-2013-PARL-AND-PRES-ELECTIONS-VALID-VOTE-VARIANCE-BY-CONST-CODE1.xlsx (233 downloads)
REPORT-9B-2013-PARL-AND-PRES-ELECTIONS-VALID-VOTE-VARIANCE-RANKING1.xlsx (226 downloads)
REPORT-9C-2007-PARL-AND-PRES-ELECTIONS-VALID-VOTE-VARIANCE-BY-CONST-CODE1.xlsx (230 downloads)
REPORT-9D-2007-PARL-AND-PRES-ELECTIONS-VALID-VOTE-VARIANCE-RANKING1.xlsx (216 downloads)
REPORT-9E-PARL-AND-PRES-ELEC-VALID-VOTE-VARIANCE-1992-TO-2013-Copy.xlsx (215 downloads)
From the above reports it was noted in the 2007 Presidential elections, Nithi constituency (old no 054) had the largest difference of 19,149 while in the 2013 Presidential election, Kuria West (new no 259) had the largest difference of 5,589.
The Kenya Election Database also discovered two anomalies in past Presidential elections where the number of votes cast actually exceeded the number of registered voters:-
1. In the 1992 elections the total votes cast in Kiharu (old Const no 84), was 70,131 against 69,282 registered voters, a variance of 849.
2. In the 2013 elections the total votes cast in Molo (new const no 166), was 54,535 against 50,621 registered voters, a variance of 3,914.
No explanation for the above anomaly in Molo in the 2013 election has been given by the IEBC, while the ECK was disbanded in 2008 before they could explain the 1992 Kiharu anomaly.
The above reports can be downloaded from www.kenyaelectiondatabase.co.ke
18th December, 2015
© 2015 STAN OYUNGA
By Stan Oyunga (email@example.com)
The winner of any free and fair elections in most African countries depends on certain parameters such as Ethnic group block voting, political parties/coalitions and voter turn-out. The ruling party/coalition usually emerges the winner due to the influence of the incumbency but recent elections in Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria has shown that this is not always the case, when the election is deemed to be free and fair.
Since 2002, the two party/coalition system (two horse race) has been evident in Kenya and has worked well except for the disastrous 2007 Presidential Elections (when a “donkey” also took part in the race). There is a clear pattern in Ethnic block voting and coalition politics that has created coalition strongholds since no single ethnic group has the numbers to produce a winning Presidential candidate. Refer to my blog “Road to Elections 2017: Who will have the numbers in 2017?” found at www.kenyaelectiondatabase.co.ke
THE TWO HORSE RACE CONTINUES
The two main coalitions in Kenya, the Jubilee Alliance and the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), control 18 and 19 counties respectively which can be considered their strongholds. 10 other counties are considered “Fifty/Fifty” where both coalitions are more or else equal.
There is no guarantee that both coalitions will hold together for the next two years but it is likely they will. The entry of the new Amani National Congress (A.N.C.) led by Musalia Mudavadi (formally of the United Democratic Front Party) is not expected to be a threat to CORD due to Mudavadi’s poor performance in 2013, when he finished 3rd with only 3.93% of the valid national vote. Mudavadi was in the Amani Coalition with KANU and New Ford Kenya (NFK) in the 2013 elections but KANU has shown little interest in joining any coalition by 2015.
While CORD intends to remain a pre-election coalition, the Jubilee Alliance Coalition has registered the Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP) in December, 2014 where all parties under the coalition are expected to dissolve and all candidates contest under JAP.
Another problem, is by forming JAP, it will make it impossible to have other parties outside the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups join the Jubilee Coalition as they will first have to dissolve their parties. Moving from a pre-election Coalition to a single political party has no advantage for Uhuru Kenyatta as he seeks to be re-elected. In fact it may be very risky due to the nature of coalition politics in Kenya. He needs to attract other parties (ethnic groups) to his coalition as he depends mainly on his Kikuyu ethnic group and Ruto’s Kalenjin ethnic group (see my blog “Road to Elections 2017: Is Uhuru sitting on a two legged stool?” also found at www.kenyaelectiondatabase.co.ke ).
Uhuru may have no choice but to retain Jubilee as a pre-election coalition in order to attract parties like the Amani National Congress (ANC), New Ford Kenya (NFK), FORD-People in Kisii and the recently formed Maendeleo Chap Chap movement in Ukambani (Lower Eastern Region) that may be transformed into a political party to challenge the Wiper Democratic Movement-Kenya (WDM-K).
The section 10 of the Political Parties Act require Coalitions to deposit their Coalition agreements 3 months prior to a General Election or 21 days after signing such an agreement after a General Election. There is simply no time to dissolve Political Parties in the Jubilee Alliance by 8th May, 2017 in order to comply with the above section. CORD already has 1.3 million more potential voters in its strongholds then Jubilee and does not plan to combine into a single party.
Thus the two horse race will continue in 2017 even if there is a donkey (Amani Coalition?), but there may be fallout or disagreement between coalition partners and one or two may shift to another coalition. I have presented 8 possible scenarios of pre-election coalitions and their respective estimated voters:-
SCENARIO 1: CORD vs JUBILEE
This is the most likely scenario in 2017. The “Big Five” main ethnic groups comprising the Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo and Kamba make up 64 % of Kenya’s citizen population hence can influence the results of any Presidential elections. Out of these “Big Five”, the Kikuyu (8.2 million population projection in 2017) and Kalenjin (6.2 million) support the Jubilee Alliance while the Luhya (6.6 million), Luo (5 million) and Kamba (4.8 million) support the CORD coalition. The next 6 ethnic groups in ranking account for 26 % of the Kenya citizen population: Kenya Somali (2.9 million), Kisii (2.7 million), Mijikenda (2.4 million), Meru (2 million), Turkana (1.2 million) and Maasai (1 million).
Hence the top 11 ranked ethnic groups will have a projected population of more than 43 million in 2017, accounting for more than 90 % of Kenya’s citizen population. Their estimated voter potential will be 17.4 million if 80 % voter registration is achieved or 19.6 million if 90 % is achieved. Whichever coalition controls the majority of the top 11 ethnic group will have a good chance to win the 2017 Presidential elections as long they achieve a high voter registration and turn-out. Refer to my blog “Road to Elections 2017: The Reality of Ethnic Block Votes” found at www.kenyaelectiondatabase.co.ke .
Out of the top 11 ethnic groups, Jubilee fully controls only 3 ethnic groups with 6.6 million estimated voters if 80 % registration is achieved while CORD mostly controls 6 ethnic groups with 9.2 million estimated voters. The Kenyan Somali and the Maasai are considered “Fifty/Fifty” as they usually vote for both coalitions. They have a total estimated voter of 1.1 million and 421,148 respectively if 80 % registration is achieved, but the Somali population may have been overstated in the 2009 census. CORD’s voters are projected to be 10.3 million, exceeding Jubilee’s 9 million by 1.3 million if 80% voter registration is achieved.
Jubilee cannot afford to sit back and hope not enough CORD supporters will turn up to register and vote in order to re-gain their “Tyranny of Numbers” in 2017. CORD has already embarked on ensuring that youths in their strongholds obtain ID cards and register as voters in time for the 2017 elections. (See attached Table 8A- TWO COALITIONS-CORD VS JUBILEE).
SCENARIO 2: CORD vs JUBILEE + 50% WESTERN
In this scenario, in order to increase its chances of winning re-election, Jubilee will have to make a pre-election deal with a party that represent a third major ethnic group from either Western Region (Luhya) or Eastern Region (Kamba), whose estimated voters in 2017 will exceed over 2 million each.
The Jubilee Alliance draws most of its support from the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Meru ethnic groups and may not win the 2017 Presidential Elections unless the CORD coalition either breaks up or fails to register enough voters and and/or they fail to turn-up to vote in large numbers as they did in 2013.
Jubilee will need to re-build bridges with the Luhya ethnic group which depends on the sugar industry for their economic lifeline. The Uganda sugar “deal” has turned out to be a public relations disaster for Jubilee just as they needed to make in-roads in Western Region before the 2017 General Elections.
Both the Bukusu (FORD-Kenya and New Ford Kenya) and Maragoli (Amani National Congress) sub-ethnic groups will account for 1 million of the estimated 2.6 million Luyha voters in 2017 and reside in Bungoma, Kakamega, Vihiga and Trans-Nzoia counties. A pre-election coalition deal may have to be signed that guarantees the Western parties certain posts and share of cabinet/parastatals/diplomatic posts. Jubilee may have to guarantee the Western parties one of two powerful posts in Kenya: Speaker of the National Assembly (3rd in line in succession for the Presidency under the constitution) or Leader of the Majority in the National Assembly. The Luhyas will expect to be given the Deputy President slot in 2022, in case Ruto goes for the Presidency.
The Western parties will never agree to dissolve and join JAP in order to increase their bargaining power within the Jubilee Alliance. Senator Moses Wetangula of Bungoma County, is party leader of FORD Kenya and a CORD principal and may not agree to leave CORD, hence will retain part of the Bukusu sub-ethnic group. The Samia sub-ethnic group and the Teso ethnic group of Busia County may remain in CORD but they account for a small part of the Western voters (372,000 estimated voters in 2017).
If Jubilee can wrest at least half of the Western Region voters from CORD, then its estimated voters will be 9.9 million against CORD’s 9.4 million, a variance of only 500,000. Bungoma, Kakamega and Vihiga are expected to become “Fifty/Fifty” counties, but Busia is expected to remain under CORD (see attached Table 8B- TWO WAY COALITIONS-CORD VS JUBILEE+50% LUHYA). Hence CORD will control 16 counties (blue), Jubilee 18 (red) and 13 (green) counties will be 50/50.
SCENARIO 3: CORD vs JUBILEE + WIPER
If Jubilee’s attempt to lure the Western Region’s voters to its side fails then its only option is to turn east to the Kamba ethnic group that occupies lower Eastern Region but has as a sizable population in Nairobi and the Coast. This ethnic group is expected to have 2 million voters in 2017 and is a principal partner in CORD with Kalonzo Musyoka, the Wiper Democratic Movement-Kenya party leader, the running mate of Raila Odinga in the 2013 elections.
Wiper has had a frosty relationship with Jubilee ever since attempts by Kalonzo to endear himself to Uhuru and Ruto just after they were indicted by the ICC in The Hague in 2011, failed. This re-buff drove Kalonzo into the hands of Raila leading to the formation of CORD in 2012. The Kambas have never forgiven Uhuru and Ruto for the mistreatment of Kalonzo and even bringing Charity Ngilu’s National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) into Jubilee in 2013 (after a brief dalliance with CORD) did not add any significant numbers to Jubilee’s vote tally in Ukambani. Uhuru received only 89,064 in Kitui, Machakos and Makueni compared to Raila’s 768,025.
There appears to be strategy by Jubilee to win Kamba voters by using Machakos Governor Alfred Mutua, who has an immaculate development record, as an alternative to Kalonzo and there is a growing movement called the Maendeleo Chap Chap in Ukambani which may end up as a political party. But this strategy may backfire as Kambas are unlikely to abandon Kalonzo especially after the treatment they have received from their Central Region “cousins”.
Hence in this scenario, Uhuru and Ruto will have to make peace and make a deal with Kalonzo that will guarantee him a significant post in the Jubilee Alliance in 2017. One possible guarantee is that Kalonzo becomes Ruto’s running mate in the 2022 Elections, meanwhile he or one of his party members can become Majority Leader (formerly Leader of Government Business) in the 12th Parliament in 2017. . Kalonzo can only end up as a running mate once again for Raila Odinga in CORD in 2017 unless Raila becomes unavailable to run and Kalonzo is chosen to stand instead. If Wiper pulls out of CORD and joins Jubilee, then CORD will have little chance of winning the 2017 elections as shown in the attached report-Table 8C- TWO WAY COALITIONS-CORD VS JUBILEE+WIPER.
The loss of Wiper will reduce CORD’s projected voters in 2017 to 8.8 million compared to Jubilee plus Wiper’s 10.5 million, a variance of 2.7 million. Hence Jubilee can afford to lose the entire Luhya block votes in 2017 as long as they have the Kamba votes. Number of CORD counties will reduce to 16 (blue) while Jubilee’s will increase to 21 (red) with Kitui, Machakos and Makueni becoming Jubilee counties. 50/50 counties (green) will be 10. The significant Kamba votes in Nairobi and the Coast will increase the Jubilee vote tally in both Regions.
SCENARIO 4: CORD vs TNA vs URP
This scenario is where there is a fall out in the Jubilee Alliance before the 2017 elections. There are elements in the United Republican Party (URP) of Deputy President William Ruto that feel he has been short changed in the Jubilee Alliance and the original agreement for “fifty/fifty” sharing of posts was not honoured as well as the suspension of three Cabinet Secretaries and some of Ruto’s staff on allegation of corruption in 2015.
Some of these elements went as far as to challenge Ruto to stand against Uhuru in 2017, a suggestion that Ruto has already dismissed. If Ruto intends to stand for the Presidency in 2022, he needs to have the Kikuyu and Meru ethnic groups as well as others in the Jubilee Alliance. Kalenjins will not take the risk of missing out on power that a Ruto presidency can bring in 2022, but this can change if Ruto is convicted and jailed by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Like the proverbial Sword of Damocles, the ICC case against William Ruto, may dramatically affect the 2017 elections if he is convicted on charges of crimes against humanity. Section 150 (ii) of the new Constitution of Kenya provides for the Deputy President’s removal from office by impeachment where there are serious reasons he has committed a crime under national and international law. Section 145 provides the procedure for removal of the Deputy President from office, which will require a motion supported by at least two thirds of all members of the National Assembly before a special committee of the Senate investigates the charges.
The ICC case against Ruto took a turn for the worse in August, 2015 when the ICC ruled that recanted witness statements can be used as evidence by the prosecution hence dealing Ruto’s case a huge blow. Hardliners in URP have started complaining that the Government did not take Ruto’s case seriously as it did for Uhuru Kenyatta whose case collapsed in December, 2014.
Since the Jubilee Alliance has a majority in the National Assembly, the resolution may not pass (“Tyranny of Numbers”) but the President may request the Deputy President to resign under section 148 (7) to avoid diplomatic sanctions. The President cannot dismiss the Deputy President. If the Deputy President is convicted before the 2017 Presidential Elections, he may be released on bail until his appeal is heard. As explained above, his impeachment by the Senate may not proceed unless the National Assembly passes a motion for the same.
Uhuru cannot risk the wrath of the Kalenjin Ethnic vote bloc and replace Ruto as his running mate in the 2017 elections even if Ruto has been convicted and is awaiting appeal of his case. Retaining Ruto as Deputy President will also be seen as an act of defiance of the ICC and show that Kenya still believes in his innocence.
While it is unlikely Kalenjins may revolt against the Kikuyus and pull out of the Jubilee Alliance and join CORD, the possibility of this “revolt” would be to deny Uhuru votes that he requires to win re-election. Even if Ruto decides to stand as a presidential candidate in 2017, as suggested by some in his URP party, he cannot win as the Jubilee vote will be divided as shown on attached report-TABLE 8D-THREE WAY COALITION-CORD VA TNA VS URP.
This will be a walkover for CORD as it will have 10.5 million estimated voters compared with 4.7 million for The Alliance Party (TNA) and 3.9 million for URP. Ruto will be committing political suicide by this option and kill his chances of being elected President in 2022.
SCENARIO 5: CORD + URP vs TNA + 100% WESTERN
In this scenario, it is assumed that there may be a fallout between TNA and URP and the Jubilee Coalition may breakup mainly due to the ICC factor. TNA may not want to be blackmailed by URP as Uhuru knows he cannot win re-election in 2017 without the Kalenjin ethnic group and their allies in Rift Valley and North-Eastern Regions.
In order to save his legacy and win re-election, Uhuru’s TNA enters a pre-election pact with Luhya ethnic group parties of Western Region and offers one of their leaders to be his running mate in 2017. This may be Moses Wetangula of FORD-Kenya as his Bukusu sub-ethnic group is the largest of the Luhya ethnic group and will have an estimated 700,000 voters compared with the Maragoli’s 300,000 estimated voters. Musalia Mudavadi of Amani National Congress is a Maragoli and may have no choice but to play second fiddle to Wetangula.
Luhyas know that their long dream of ascending to the Presidency in 2022 can come true if they join TNA in an Coalition rather than stay in CORD and risk not only losing in 2017 but also in 2022. Even if CORD wins in both 2017 and 2022, the Luhyas may not gain the Deputy President’s post in case Wiper’s Kalonzo Musyoka claims the slot.
In retaliation for TNA’s decision to select a Luhya running mate to replace Ruto in 2017, the URP may join forces with the CORD rump (minus FORD-Kenya) and sign a pre-election agreement that will give Raila Odinga the Presidency for only one term with Ruto as his running mate. This will be Raila’s best chance to assume the Presidency after failing three times and will renew their ODM partnership that fell apart during the five year term of the Grand Coalition Government (2008-2013). Wiper will have to be convinced to let Ruto be Raila’s running mate in 2017 instead of Kalonzo Musoyka who will then be Ruto’s running mate in 2022.
This arrangement will depend if Ruto will escape conviction and jailing by the ICC as in case of conviction, as his appeal may run beyond the 2017 elections. It will guarantee CORD + URP Coalition victory in 2017 as they will have 11.4 million estimated voters against TNA + Western Coalition’s 7.9 million, a variance of 3.4 million, as shown in the attached report-Table 8E- TWO WAY COALITIONS-CORD+URP vs TNA+WESTERN. CORD + URP Coalition will control 24 counties with TNA+WESTERN with 13 counties and 10 counties as 50/50. This option will end up with Uhuru failing to be re-elected in 2017, hence he cannot afford to drop Ruto under any circumstances, but Ruto has the option of leaving Jubilee in 2017 and partnering with CORD and still have a good chance of being elected in 2022. In politics there are no permanent enemies, it’s the numbers that matters. In any case Ruto will simply be “returning home” where he was in 2007.
SCENARIO 6: CORD vs JUBILEE vs 100% WESTERN
This scenario is again unlikely, but still possible if the Luhya ethnic group leaves the CORD Coalition and presents its own Presidential candidate who may be either Moses Watengula or Musalia Mudavadi. The purpose of this would be to sign a post-election coalition with which ever Coalition wins the 2017 elections. This is similar to what Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya’s deal with the Party of National Unity in January 2008, when Kalonzo Musyoka was appointed Vice-President in order to support Mwai Kibaki’s weak government following the disputed 2007 Presidential elections.
CORD rump (minus Western Region) will have 7.9 estimated voters, Jubilee 9 million (a variance of 1 million) and Western only 2.3 million as shown in the attached report-Table 8F- THREE WAY COALITIONS-CORD vs JUBILEE vs WESTERN. This option shows CORD cannot win without the Western Region votes and this will most benefit Jubilee but they may prefer a pre-election coalition agreement to breakup CORD (see scenario 2 above). If Jubilee can reach a pre-election agreement then a Jubilee/Western Coalition will have 11.4 million estimated voters, which will exceed CORD rump by a massive 3.4 million voters.
SCENARIO 7: CORD vs JUBILEE vs WIPER
This scenario is also unlikely but may come about by breakup of the CORD Coalition with the Wiper party leaving and presenting its own candidate who is expected to be Kalonzo Musyoka. This will be a repeat of the 2007 fiasco, when the then Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K) presented Kalonzo as its Presidential candidate thus handing Mwai Kibaki victory in the disputed election that led to post-election violence. Kalonzo may again want to make a post-election deal with Jubilee, but there would be no advantage as a Jubilee government formed after the 2017 election victory will not need support to rule as Kibaki’s PNU did after the 2007 elections. The PNU/ODM-K government ruled for only less than two months before it was replaced by the Grand Coalition Government that was formed after the international mediated agreement signed on 28th February, 2008 that brought Raila’s Orange Democratic Movement into the Government.
CORD rump (minus Wiper) will have 8.8 million estimated voters, Jubilee 9 million (a dead heat) and Wiper only 1.5 million as shown in the attached report-Table 8G- THREE WAY COALITIONS-CORD vs JUBILEE vs WIPER. This option shows that CORD rump cannot defeat Jubilee without Wiper, although the results may be a dead-heat.
SCENARIO 8: CORD vs JUBILEE vs COAST
This scenario may happen if the Coast Region forms a political party or a coalition of Coast home grown parties to represents its interest and exits CORD before the 2017 elections. The new party or coalition will then bargain with whichever coalition emerges the winner in 2017. This option is very risky as the Coast does not have the numbers to sponsor a Presidential candidate in 2017.
The attached report-Table 8H- THREE WAY COALITIONS-CORD vs JUBILEE vs COAST, shows that CORD cannot win the 2017 elections without the Coast Region’s 1.9 million estimated voters. This scenario shows that CORD rump (without the Coast region) will have 8.4 million voters, Jubilee will have 9 million, hence a variance of 500,000. If Jubilee manages to enter a pre-election agreement with the Coast Region before 2017, then their combined voters will be 10.8 million, which will ensure Jubilee victory in 2017, as it will exceed CORD voters by 2.4 million. Again, Coastal parties may never agree to dissolve and join JAP in order to not lose their identity. The Coast Region will expect to be given senior positions in a pre-election agreement with Jubilee before the 2017 elections and guarantee of the Deputy President slot in 2022.
Some of the eight scenarios mentioned above may seem farfetched, but coalition politics in Kenya is very dynamic as was seen just prior to the 2013 elections, when one of the Presidential candidates had been promised the top seat by the very coalition that went on to win the elections.
If any of the principals of CORD pulls out of the coalition and joins Jubilee, it will have a dramatic and profound effect on Kenya politics due to ethnic voting blocks. Should the Deputy President be convicted before the 2017 elections, his followers may make demands on him to challenge for the top seat or leave Jubilee, despite the risk involved.
The unavailability of a Coalition principle or party leader before the 2017 elections can change the face of Kenya politics overnight and create scenarios that have not even been mentioned above.
Elections are about numbers, and the party/coalition that can ensure that most of its supporters register and majority of them turn-up to vote on Tuesday, 8th August, 2017, will win the elections. It is after all, a game of numbers.
11th September, 2015
© 2015 STAN OYUNGA
REPORT-8A-2017-COALITION-VOTER-EST-2-WAY-COALITION-CORD-VS-JUBILEE.xls (317 downloads)
REPORT-8B-2017-COALITION-VOTER-EST-2-WAY-COALITION-CORD-VS-JUBILEE-50%-WESTERN.xls (264 downloads)
REPORT-8C-2017-COALITION-VOTER-EST-2-WAY-COALITION-CORD-VS-JUBILEE-WIPER.xls (249 downloads)
REPORT-8D-2017-COALITION-VOTER-EST-3-WAY-COALITION-CORD-VS-TNA-VS-URP.xls (266 downloads)
REPORT-8E-2017-COALITION-VOTER-EST-2-WAY-COALITION-CORD-URP-VS-TNA-WESTERN.xls (281 downloads)
REPORT-8F-2017-COALITION-VOTER-EST-3-WAY-COALITIONS-CORD-VS-JUBILEE-VS-WESTERN.xls (275 downloads)
REPORT-8G-2017-COALITION-VOTER-EST-3-WAY-COALITIONS-CORD-VS-JUBILEE-VS-WIPER.xls (258 downloads)
REPORT-8H-2017-COALITION-VOTER-EST-3-WAY-COALITIONS-CORD-VS-JUBILEE-VS-COAST.xls (270 downloads)