THE SECRET OF THE 2007 ELECTIONS THAT WAS NEVER REVEALED

By Stan Oyunga (stanoyunga@yahoo.com)

INTRODUCTION

The 2007 Presidential Elections remains a watershed in Kenya’s history, which triggered its worst political crisis since independence and threatened its status as a haven of peace in Eastern Africa.
The events of Sunday, December 30TH, 2007 still remain fresh in the minds of Kenyans, especially those who lost loved ones, were injured, lost property or were displaced in the post-election violence that followed.
It resulted in the deaths of 1,333 people and the displacement of over 600,000, with loss of billions of shillings in property and to the economy, but it could have been avoided if a small paragraph in the election regulations had not been invoked.

THE KAMKUNJI ELECTIONS FIASCO

Ironically, the 2007 General Elections were held smoothly and peacefully except in Kilgoris in Trans Nzoia District where the Parliamentary election results were cancelled due to violence. The Kilgoris elections were repeated in 2008.
In Kamukunji in Nairobi Province, the results of both Parliamentary and Presidential elections were cancelled due violence at the tallying centre, leading to damage and loss of some ballot boxes.
The Election Commission of Kenya (now defunct) cancelled the results of this election due to violence at the tallying centre and ordered the Parliamentary elections repeated. A candidate, Simon Mbugua filed an application for Judicial Review against the ECK for failing to declare him the winner. In August, 2008, the High Court ordered the ECK to announce the results of the parliamentary elections, ruling ECK had no mandate to order a repeat election.
Simon Mbugua of PNU was declared elected as MP, eight months since the election was held, and making history as the longest time it had taken to declare a winner of an election in Kenya. Only the results of the leading 3 candidates were announced and total number of votes cast and valid votes were never released. The election of Simon Mbugua was later nullified by the High Court in January 2011 after a successful petition. A By-election was set for 23/5/2011 but was stopped by a court order which was later lifted. The By-election was eventually held on 18/8/2011 and was won by Yusuf Hassan Abdi of PNU.
The ECK did not order a repeat of the Kamukunji Constituency Presidential election, hence it was the first in Kenya’s history where the results of a presidential election at constituency level were never released. The ECK may have used a little known section in a regulation under the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, Cap 7 (now repealed) not to order a repeat as they did for the Parliamentary election (but never gazetted).
Section 41 (2) (a) of the National Assembly and Presidential Regulations, states, inter alia:-
“in the case of a presidential election, whether or not forming part of a joint election, hold the certificate until the results of that election in every constituency have been received and thereafter publish a notice in the Gazette declaring the person who has received the greatest number of votes in the election, and has complied with the provisions of section 5 of the Constitution, to have been elected President: Provided that the Electoral Commission may declare a candidate elected as the President before all the constituencies have delivered their results if in its opinion the results that have not been received will not make a difference as to the winner on the basis of section 5 of the Constitution.”
Without the results of the Kamukunji Presidential election, the ECK appeared to have used the above section to declare Mwai Kibaki of the PNU as winner of the 2007 Presidential Elections. Since the total registered voters for Kamukunji was 119,015, and Mwai Kibaki had received 4,578,034 against ODM’s Raila Odinga’s 4,352,860 from the 209 constituencies (a difference of only 255,174); the ECK concluded that repeating the Kamukunji elections would have not made a difference. This was the closest Presidential election in Kenya’s history and among the closest in Africa.

MYSTERY OF KAMUKUNJI PRESIDENTIAL RESULTS

What if the difference was less than 119,015, the number of registered voters in Kamukunji Constituency? Would the ECK have still declared Mwai Kibaki the winner? This is the million dollar question, which nobody has dared ask in nearly eight years. 106,160 more votes was what was required to prevent the ECK from declaring Mwai Kibaki President on that fateful Sunday afternoon and letting Kenya sink into unprecedented violence that lasted two months. Sould the ECK have delayed the swearing in at State House that took place at dusk on 30th, December 2007, to allow for further consultation and legal advice?
If the presidential election ballot boxes were damaged or destroyed after the chaos at the Constituency tallying centre, the ECK would have officially cancelled the election under section 25A (1), which states, inter alia:-
25A. (1) Where a date has been appointed for holding of an election, and there is reason to believe that a serious breach of peace is likely to occur if the election is held on that date or it is impossible to conduct the elections as a result of natural disasters or other emergencies, the Electoral Commission may postpone the election and shall in respect of the area, or areas concerned, appoint another date for the holding of the postponed election.
(2) Where an election is postponed under paragraph (1), the election shall be held at the earliest practicable time.
After failing to obtain results from Kamukunji Constituency, the ECK announced on 29th December, 2007 that the elections would be repeated and left blank the results of Kamukunji on the official gazette notice no 12615/07. In a strange twist of events the ECK never officially cancelled the results since in January, 2008, it ordered the Returning officer to compile results from Form 16A posted on walls of classrooms in the polling stations and also pluck them from the 135 available ballot boxes out of the 157 original ballot boxes. The Form 16A were then used to compile results of the top three candidates in both the Presidential and Parliamentary elections but never publicly released the Presidential result tally. (See attached Election Petition no 35 of 2008 from Kenya Law Reports).
Since there was no Presidential election petition filed by the loser, Raila Odinga of ODM, the fate of the ballots of the Kamukunji Presidential Election was never resolved and remains a symbol of all that went wrong in the 2007 General Elections. Had the gap between Kibaki and Raila been less than the number of registered voters for Kamukunji, Mwai Kibaki would legally not have been declared President but would have still have continued as President until repeat of the Kamukunji elections.
What if the Presidential vote tally was manipulated to ensure the gap was to be above 119,015 to allow section 42(2) (a) to be invoked and promptly declare Mwai Kibaki as President? The answer to this question may never be known and even the then Chairman of the ECK, the late Samuel Kivuitu later stated that he was “under pressure” to declare Kibaki the winner and he was not even sure who actually won the 2007 Presidential elections.
ECK should have issued a Gazette notice under Section 25A (1) of the National Assembly and Presidential Election Regulations, to cancel and set a repeat date for both the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. The post-election violence of 2007/2008 would have been prevented or would not have been so intense. Why did the ECK not act as per the law? Why were the voters of Kamukunji denied their constitutional right to elect a President of their choice? It took a record eight months for the Parliamentary results to be released (by court order) only for them to be nullified in January, 2011, over three years later!
A gazette notice would have countermanded any results then announced by the returning officer, as it was clear not all ballot boxes had been availed for counting and certified by Form 16A as required by the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Regulations. No credible election had taken place in Kumukunji in 2007, as per the landmark judgement by Lady Justice Mary Ang’awa on 27th January, 2011 in Election Petition no 35 of 2008.

CONCLUSION

The Kamukunji Constituency election of 2007 still remains the worst handled constituency election in Kenya’s history and turned-out to be a fiasco. The “instant” declaration of a candidate as President was ended by Article 141 of the new Constitution of Kenya, 2010 which allows a losing candidate to file a petition to challenge the results, hence the leading candidate cannot be sworn as President until the petition is determined. A run-off election is now required by Article 138 if the leading candidate fails to attain 50% plus 1 of the votes cast. The electoral body can no longer give an “opinion” as every vote cast must be counted.
The Election Commission of Kenya was dissolved on 29th December, 2008, following the enactment of the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment), Act, 2008 and replaced by the Interim Independent Election Commission (IIEC).

Election_Petition_35_of_2008.pdf (287 downloads)

31st August, 2015
© 2015 STAN OYUNGA

RAILA ODINGA: A DREAM FULFILLED OR END OF THE ROAD?

By Stan Oyunga (stanoyunga@yahoo.com)

INTRODUCTION

In exactly two years from now (August 2017), Kenyans would have re-elected Uhuru Kenyatta for a second term as President or would have shown him the door and made history as the first country in East Africa to have replaced an incumbent President; or the leading Presidential candidate would have failed to garner the 50% +1 figure required to be declared elected and Kenyans would be preparing for a run-off Presidential election for the first time.
The most likely person to defeat Uhuru Kenyatta in 2017 and become Kenya’s 5th President, would be party leader of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Raila Amolo Odinga who is also the de facto leader of the Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy (CORD). Raila will be making his 4th attempt to be president, the closest being in 2007, when the results were disputed, leading to Kenya’s worst political crisis since independence. Over 1,000 people died in the post-election violence that followed the announcement of the results.

WHO REALLY HAS THE NUMBERS?

The “Big Five” main ethnic groups comprising the Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo and Kamba make up 64 % of Kenya’s citizen population hence can influence the results of any Presidential elections. Out of these “Big Five”, the Kikuyu (8.2 million population projection in 2017) and Kalenjin (6.2 million) support the Jubilee coalition while the Luhya (6.6 million), Luo (5 million) and Kamba (4.8 million) support the CORD coalition. The next 6 ethnic groups in ranking account for 26 % of the Kenya citizen population: Kenya Somali (2.9 million), Kisii (2.7 million), Mijikenda (2.4 million), Meru (2 million), Turkana (1.2 million) and Maasai (1 million).
Hence the top 11 ranked ethnic groups will have a projected population of more than 43 million in 2017, accounting for more than 90 % of Kenya’s citizen population. Their estimated voter potential will be 17.4 million if 80 % voter registration is achieved or 19.6 million if 90 % is achieved. Whichever coalition controls the majority of the top 11 ethnic group will have a good chance to win the 2017 Presidential elections as long they achieve a high voter registration and turn-out. Refer to my blog “Road to Kenya Elections 2017: The Reality of Ethnic Block Votes” found at www.kenyaelectiondatabase.co.ke .
Out of the top 11 ethnic groups, Jubilee controls only 3 ethnic groups with total estimated voter of 6.6 million if 80 % registration is achieved while CORD controls 5 ethnic groups with total estimated voter of 9.2 million. The Kenyan Somali and Maasai are considered “Fifty/Fifty” as they usually vote for both coalitions. They have a total estimated voter of 1.1 million and 421,148 respectively if 80 % registration is achieved, although the Somali population may be overstated.
CORD’s voters are projected to be 10.7 million, exceeding Jubilee’s 8 million by 2.7 million if 80% voter registration is achieved. If 90% registration is achieved then CORD’s voters will be 12.1 million and exceed Jubilee’s 9 million by 3 million.
Hence if CORD holds together and archives at least 80% voter registration and 80% voter turn-out (“double 80”) from its strongholds, then Raila has a very good chance of achieving his 20 year ambition to be President of Kenya.
Jubilee already knows that CORD will have the numbers by 2017 so will try any means to break the coalition’s unity.

CAN CORD HOLD TOGETHER IN 2017?

The three co-Principles in CORD, Raila Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka of Wiper Democratic Movement-Kenya and Moses Wetangula of FORD-Kenya will most likely have to sign a new pre-election agreement to select which one of them will be the coalition’s presidential candidate in 2017 with one of them as the running mate. One of the principals will have to be given a powerful post in the 12th Parliament, such as Speaker of the National Assembly (who is 3rd in succession to the president); or Leader of the Majority (formerly Leader of Government Business in Parliament). He will have to stand for election as Member of Parliament or be nominated by his party.
Other parties in CORD may be given posts such as Majority Leader in the Senate and Cabinet Secretary posts under the pre-election agreement. Heads of Parastatals, National Commissions and diplomatic posts will also have to be shared as part of the agreement.
A joint Primary election by parties in CORD may not be an option as it is not covered by any law in Kenya, hence can be challenged as unconstitutional. Coalitions are just a group of political parties who follow a common objective and do not have legal status and own assets as political parties.
Raila has an advantage not only as the leader ODM, the largest party in CORD but also the most senior of the co-principals and de facto leader of CORD. It may also be Raila’s last chance to become president and his co-principal are expected to endorse him on certain conditions to be included in a pre-election agreement.

SHOULD RAILA DO A “MANDELA”?

One of the conditions would be doing a “Mandela” where a presidential candidate agrees to serve only one term and does not offer himself for re-election. In May, 1994, Nelson Mandela was sworn in as the first black president of South Africa and retired in June, 1999, despite the constitution allowing to serve for another term if re-elected.
With some African leaders amending their constitutions to extend their normal two-terms to a third term or even remove time limits, Mandela’s example was viewed as selfless and unique in Africa.
If Raila agrees to stand for only one term, he will be lifting himself to a higher pedestal and win support from his co-principals and their supporters. If Kalonzo Musyoka becomes Raila’s running mate in 2017, then he will stand a good chance of being CORD’s presidential candidate in 2022 with Moses Watangula as his running mate.
As no single ethnic group can win the presidential elections on its own, both the Kamba and Luhya ethnic groups will not risk leaving CORD unless Jubilee lures one of them with a pre-election coalition agreement that gives either of them powerful positions in a coalition government. But with Jubilee going from a coalition to a single party, Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP), there will be no room for other parties unless they agree to dissolve. (See my blog “Road to Kenya Elections 2017: Is Uhuru sitting on a two legged stool?” posted at www.kenyaelectiondatabase.com ).

WILL MUDAVADI BE A THREAT TO CORD IN WESTERN?

CORD’s biggest challenge in winning the 2017 elections would if part of the Luhya ethnic group presents an alternative presidential candidate to Raila or if he cannot stand, Kalonzo Musyoka. Once again Musalia Mudavadi may act as the spoiler and stand under his new party, Amani National Coalition (ANC) but is not expected to be a threat to CORD due to Mudavadi’s poor performance in 2013, when he finished 3rd with only 3.93% of the valid national vote.
Mudavadi’s United Democratic Front Party (UDF) was in the Amani Coalition with KANU and New Ford Kenya (NFK) in the 2013 elections but KANU has shown little interest in joining any coalition by 2017. Mudavadi’s tactic may be to convince Western Region voters to join his party as the only one that represents their interests, but he may not perform any better if he stands again as a Presidential candidate. With the 2013 fiasco when he was invited and then literally booted out of the Jubilee coalition still fresh in voter’s mind, the Uganda sugar “deal” has already reduced Jubilee’s little standing in Western Province even lower. Mudavadi knows he draws support from his Maragoli and part of the Bukusu sub-ethnic group, who depend on the sugar industry for their livelihood. Any alliance with Jubilee will be seen as a betrayal so he either remains a lone ranger in 2017 or swallows his pride and joins the CORD coalition.

A DREAM FULFILLED OR END OF THE ROAD?

The 2017 Presidential Elections will see Raila Amolo Odinga fulfil his dream of becoming Kenya’s President or consign him as a “Moses” who despite leading the Israelites out of bondage in Egypt, never entered the Promised Land despite seeing it from atop Mt Nebo.
It has been said that it is easier for a Luo to become President of the United States than President of Kenya so will 2017 prove the pundits wrong? Will he join Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, the late Michael Sata of Zambia and Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria who were all elected President on their 4th attempt?

28th August, 2015
© 2015 STAN OYUNGA

ROAD TO ELECTIONS 2017: IS UHURU SITTING ON A TWO LEGGED STOOL?

By Stan Oyunga (stanoyunga@yahoo.com)

INTRODUCTION

In exactly two years from now (August 2017), Kenyans would have re-elected Uhuru Kenyatta for a second term as President or would have shown him the door and made history as the first country in East Africa to have replaced an incumbent President; or the leading Presidential candidate would have failed to garner the 50% +1 figure required to be declared elected and Kenyans would be preparing for a run-off Presidential election for the first time.
While Uhuru Kenyatta is not only the youngest person to be elected President of Kenya, he is by far the most popular and has endeared himself to Kenyans by his down to earth attitude and demeanour. Young Kenyans consider him “cool” although he will be 54 years on October 26th, 2015. Besides being Kenya’s first digital President, with his interactive website and twitter account, he makes occasional surprise visits with minimal security and donates to those in need of medical attention or education fees without any publicity. He has provided youths in slum areas with employment and expanded the National Youth Service ten-fold.
With such a popular leader, why is his re-election in 2017 NOT a done deal?

COALTION POLITICS

The winner of any free and fair elections in most African countries depends on certain parameters such as Ethnic group block voting, political parties/coalitions and voter turn-out.
The ruling party/coalition usually emerges the winner due to the influence of the incumbency but recent elections in Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria has shown that this is not always the case, when the election is deemed to be free and fair.
Since 2002, the two party/coalition system has been evident in Kenya and has worked well except for the disastrous 2007 Presidential Elections. There is a clear pattern in Ethnic block voting and coalition politics that has created coalition strongholds since no single ethnic group has the numbers to produce a winning Presidential candidate. Refer to my blog “Road to Kenya Elections 2017: Who will have the numbers in 2017” found at www.kenyaelectiondatabase.co.ke .
The two main coalitions in Kenya, the Jubilee Coalition and the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), control 18 and 19 counties respectively which can be considered their strongholds. 10 other counties are considered “Fifty/Fifty” where both coalitions are more or else equal. (See attached Table 8A- TWO COALITIONS-CORD VS JUBILEE).

There is no guarantee that both coalitions will hold together for the next two years but it is likely they will. The entry of the new Amani National Party (A.N.C.) led by Musalia Mudavadi (formally of the United Democratic Front Party) is not expected to be a threat to CORD due to Mudavadi’s poor performance in 2013, when he finished 3rd with only 3.93% of the valid national vote. Mudavadi was in the Amani Coalition with KANU and New Ford Kenya (NFK) in the 2013 elections but KANU has shown little interest in joining any coalition by 2017.
While CORD intends to remain a pre-election coalition, the Jubilee Coalition had registered the Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP) in December, 2014 where all parties under the coalition are expected to dissolve and all candidates contest under JAP. But in a strange twist of events, Jubilee coalition abandoned JAP and instead announced in November, 2015 that a new party to be called the Jubilee Party (JP) will replace all parties in the coalition. The parties were required to dissolve by 19th December, 2015.

IS FORMATION OF JUBILEE PARTY A BLUNDER?

This move by Jubilee may be a blunder as already some supporters of the United Republican Party (URP) of the Deputy President William Ruto are resisting plans to dissolve the party. The Political Parties Act, 2011 does not allow elected members of any party to join another party without first resigning from their sponsoring party hence resulting in a By-election. But Section 11 (7) of the above act allows sitting MPs whose parties have merged with another to join the new party or become an independent member without losing their seats for the remainder of their term. As current party officials in TNA, URP and other affiliated parties will have to fight to be elected as interim officials of JP hence causing conflicts since both TNA and URP are competitors in areas of the Rift Valley (e.g. Nakuru and Eldoret).
When it comes time for party nominations for the 2017 General Elections, the losers may decide to look for other parties to nominate them to enable them to take part in the General Elections or stand as independent candidates. In some cases this will lead to the strange situation of a party under CORD or another coalition having a seat in a Jubilee Party stronghold. This actually happened in the 2013 General Elections when the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) won in Igembe Central and Tigania East, hence were counted as being under of CORD despite being in a Jubilee Coalition stronghold.
By forming the Jubilee Party, it will make it difficult to have other major parties outside the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups join the Jubilee Coalition as they will first have to dissolve their parties (e.g. Luhya, Kisii, Coastal), a move that will make them lose their identity. Moving from a pre-election Coalition to a single political party has no advantage for Uhuru Kenyatta as he seeks to be re-elected. In fact it may be very risky due to the nature of coalition politics in Kenya. He needs to attract other parties (ethnic groups) to his coalition as he depends mainly on his Kikuyu ethnic group, Meru and Ruto’s Kalenjin ethnic group. Uhuru should retain Jubilee as a pre-election coalition in order to attract other parties as Kenyans tend to identify with their ethnic groups especially in voting patterns.
The section 10 of the Political Parties Act requires Coalitions to deposit their Coalition agreements 3 months prior to a General Election or 21 days after signing such an agreement after a General Election. Dissolving Political Parties in the Jubilee Coalition and merging them with the Jubilee Party before April, 2017 may render the pre-election coalition agreement dull and void and Jubilee may lose its status of the majority coalition under section 108 of the Constitution.
CORD already has 1.5 million more potential voters in its strongholds then Jubilee (see my blog “Road to Kenya Elections 2017: Who will have the numbers?”) and does not plan to combine into a single party.

ETHNIC BLOCK VOTE COMBINATIONS

The “Big Five” main ethnic groups comprising the Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo and Kamba make up 64 % of Kenya’s citizen population hence can influence the results of any Presidential elections. Out of these “Big Five”, the Kikuyu (8.2 million population projection in 2017) and Kalenjin (6.2 million) support the Jubilee coalition while the Luhya (6.6 million), Luo (5 million) and Kamba (4.8 million) support the CORD coalition. The next 6 ethnic groups in ranking account for 26 % of the Kenya citizen population: Kenya Somali (2.9 million), Kisii (2.7 million), Mijikenda (2.4 million), Meru (2 million), Turkana (1.2 million) and Maasai (1 million).
Hence the top 11 ranked ethnic groups listed below will have a projected population of more than 43 million in 2017, accounting for more than 90 % of Kenya’s citizen population. Their estimated voter potential will be 17.4 million if 80 % voter registration is achieved or 19.6 million if 90 % is achieved. Whichever coalition controls the majority of the top 11 ethnic group will have a good chance to win the 2017 Presidential elections as long they achieve a high voter registration and turn-out. Refer to my blog “Road to Kenya Elections 2017: The Reality of Ethnic Block Votes” found at www.kenyaelectiondatabase.co.ke .

The table below shows that out of the top 11 ethnic groups, Jubilee controls only 3 ethnic groups with total estimated voter of 6.6 million if 80 % registration is achieved while CORD controls 5 ethnic groups with total estimated voter of 9.2 million. The Maasai and the Kenyan Somali are considered “Fifty/Fifty” as they usually vote for both coalitions. They have a total estimated voter of 1.1 million and 421,148 respectively if 80 % registration is achieved.

[table id=47 /]

Note: The Somali and Turkana population census figures may need verification after the 2009 census as the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) raised a red flag on figures from 8 Districts in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Turkana.

The table below gives the projected ethnic voter potential in 2017 of the two coalitions among Kenya’s 43 ethnic groups. CORD’s voters are projected to be 10.7 million, exceeding Jubilee’s 8 million by 2.7 million if 80% voter registration is achieved. If 90% registration is achieved then CORD’s voters will be 12.1 million and exceed Jubilee’s 9 million by 3 million.

[table id=48 /]
Jubilee cannot afford to sit back and hope not enough CORD supports will turn up to register and vote in order to re-gain their “Tyranny of Numbers” in 2017. CORD has already embarked on ensuring that youths in their strongholds obtain ID cards and register as voters in time for the 2017 elections.

IS WESTERN REGION JUBILEE’S ACHILLES HEEL?

In order to increase its chances of winning re-election, Jubilee will have to make a pre-election deal with a party that represent a third major ethnic group from either Western Region (Luhya) or Eastern Region (Kamba), whose estimated voters in 2017 will exceed over 2 million each.
From the above tables it is clear that the Jubilee Coalition draws most of its support from the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Meru ethnic groups and may not win the 2017 Presidential Elections unless the CORD coalition either break-ups or fails to register enough voters and and/or they fail to turn-up to vote in large numbers as they did in 2013.
Jubilee’s Achilles heel has been Western Region and Uhuru Kenyatta performed so dismal there in 2013 that he received only 66,185 (5.53%), compared with 181,961 (10.55%) in Nyanza. Former President Mwai Kibaki managed to get 312,300 (32.21%) in Western Region in 2007, considering that the Luhya ethnic group is projected to have the second largest voting bloc in 2017 with 2.6 million voters.
Uhuru had been on a charm offensive as part of Jubilee’s strategy to lure the Western Region from the grip of CORD. He had appointed Eugene Wamalwa, party leader of New Ford Kenya of Amani Coalition as a Cabinet Secretary in early 2015 and other leaders from the region as Parastatal heads, board members and diplomats. These appointments may have little impact as it removes these leaders from the political scene and those who want to stand in 2017 will have to resign from their positions.
After President Uhuru visited Western Region in June, 2015 to bail-out the financially troubled Mumias Sugar Company, the move appeared to endure him to the people but in a bizarre turn of event, the gains were eroded during Uhuru’s state visit to Uganda in August, 2015. It was announced that Kenya had signed a deal to import sugar from Uganda in exchange for Kenya’s export of milk and beef. Although the Kenya Government denied that any deal had been signed, the leaders of CORD took the opportunity to denounce the “deal”, claiming that importation of Uganda sugar will affect the sugar cane farmers who depend on the sugar industry for their livelihood.
Jubilee will need to re-build bridges with the Luhya ethnic group which depends on the sugar industry for their economic lifeline, especially after the collapse of the Pan Paper Mill in Webuye, the largest industry in Western Region in the 1990s. The Uganda sugar “deal” has turned out to be a public relations disaster for Jubilee just as they needed to make in-roads in Western Region before the 2017 General Elections.
Jubilee will somehow have to re-build the economy of Western Region and revive both the Pan Paper Mill in Webuye and the sugar industries including Mumias Sugar within the next two years (a mini Marshall Plan for Western Region). This may palate both the Bukusu and Maragoli sub-ethnic groups (which will account for 1 million of the estimated 2.6 million Luyha voters in 2017). A pre-election coalition deal may have to be signed that guarantees the Western parties certain posts and share of cabinet/parastatals/diplomatic posts. Jubilee may have to guarantee the Western parties one of two powerful posts in Kenya: Speaker of the National Assembly (3rd in line in succession for the Presidency under the constitution) or Leader of the Majority in the National Assembly. The Western parties will never agree to dissolve and join JAP in order to increase their bargaining power within the Jubilee Coalition.
If Jubilee can wrest at least half of the Western Region voters from CORD, then its estimated voters will be 9.9 million against CORD’s 9.4 million, a variance of 500,000. Bungoma, Kakamega and Vihiga are expected to become “Fifty/Fifty” counties, but Busia is expected to remain under CORD (see attached Table 8B- TWO WAY COALITIONS-CORD VS JUBILEE+50% LUHYA). Hence CORD will control 16 counties (blue), Jubilee 18 (red) and 13 (green) counties will be 50/50.

SHOULD JUBILEE LOOK EAST?

If Jubilee’s attempt to lure the Western Region’s voters to its side fails then its only option is to turn east to the Kamba ethnic group that occupies lower Eastern Region but has as a sizable population in Nairobi and the Coast. This ethnic group is expected to have 2 million voters in 2017 and is a principal partner in CORD with Kalonzo Musyoka, the Wiper Democratic Movement-Kenya party leader, being running mate of Raila Odinga in the 2013 elections. Wiper has had a frosty relationship with Jubilee ever since attempts by Kalonzo to endear himself to Uhuru and Ruto just after they were indicted by the ICC in The Hague in 2011, failed. This re-buff drove Kalonzo into the hands of Raila leading to the formation of CORD in 2012. The Kambas have never forgiven Uhuru and Ruto for the mistreatment of Kalonzo and even bringing Charity Ngilu’s National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) into Jubilee in 2013 (after a brief dalliance with CORD) did not add any significant numbers to Jubilee’s vote tally in Ukambani. Uhuru received only 89,064 in Kitui, Machakos and Makueni compared to Raila’s 768,025. Ngilu could not even win the Kitui Senatorial race.
There appears to be strategy by Jubilee to win Kamba voters by using Machakos Governor Alfred Mutua, who has an immaculate development record, as an alternative to Kalonzo and there is a growing movement called the Maendeleo Chap Chap in Ukambani which may end up as a political party. But this strategy may backfire as Kambas are unlikely to abandon Kalonzo especially after the treatment they have received from their Central Region “cousins”.
Uhuru and Ruto will have to make peace and make a deal with Kalonzo that will guarantee him a significant post in the Jubilee Coalition in 2017. One possible guarantee is that Kalonzo becomes Ruto’s running mate in the 2022 Elections, meanwhile he can become Majority Leader (formerly Leader of Government Business) in the 12th Parliament. Kalonzo can only end up as a running mate once again for Raila Odinga in CORD in 2017 unless Raila becomes unavailable to run and Kalonzo is chosen to stand instead. If Wiper pulls out of CORD and joins Jubilee, then CORD will have little chance of winning the 2017 elections as shown in the attached report-Table 8C- TWO WAY COALITIONS-CORD VS JUBILEE+WIPER.
The loss of Wiper will reduce CORD’s projected votes in 2017 to 8.5 million compared to Jubilee plus Wiper’s 10.5 million, a variance of 2 million. Hence Jubilee can afford to lose the entire Luhya block votes in 2017 as long as they have the Kamba votes. Number of CORD counties will reduce to 16 (blue) while Jubilee’s will increase to 21 (red) with Kitui, Machakos and Makueni becoming Jubilee counties. 50/50 counties (green) will be 10. The significant Kamba votes in Nairobi and the Coast will increase the Jubilee vote tally in both Regions.

THE ICC FACTOR IN THE JUBILEE COALITION

Like the proverbial Sword of Damocles, the ICC case against Deputy President William Ruto, may dramatically affect the 2017 elections if he is convicted on charges of crimes against humanity. Section 150 of the Constitution of Kenya (ii) provides for the Deputy President’s removal from office by impeachment where there are serious reasons he has committed a crime under national and international law. Section 145 provides the procedure for removal of the Deputy President from office, which will require a motion supported by at least two thirds of all members of the National Assembly before a special committee of the Senate investigates the charges.
Since the Jubilee Coalition has a majority in the National Assembly, the resolution may not pass (“Tyranny of Numbers”) but the President may request the Deputy President to resign under section 148 (7) to avoid diplomatic sanctions. The President cannot dismiss the Deputy President. If the Deputy President is convicted before the 2017 Presidential Elections, he may be released on bail until his appeal is heard. As explained above, his impeachment by the Senate may not proceed unless the National Assembly passes a motion for the same.
If Ruto is re-elected as Deputy President in 2017 and then convicted during his second term, he may still continue in office unless he is impeached by the Senate or he decides to resign while awaiting results of his appeal. If the appeal is dismissed, then Ruto will have no option but to resign as he may be jailed by the ICC in The Hague.
Uhuru cannot risk the wrath of the Kalenjin Ethnic vote bloc and replace Ruto as his running mate in the 2017 elections even if Ruto has been convicted and is awaiting appeal of his case. Retaining Ruto will also be seen as an act of defiance of the ICC and show that Kenya still believes in his innocence. Ruto will hope that he is either acquitted or if convicted, his appeal will be heard after the 2017 elections. If Ruto is jailed by the ICC, and has no other avenue of appeal, he will be requested to resign and Uhuru may replace him with a leader from the Kalenjin ethnic group. Sympathy for Ruto will grow dramatically as Ruto will be seen as a sacrificial lamb by his supporters.
If this leader is a sitting member of the National Assembly, Senate, Cabinet Secretary or Public Officer then he will have to resign upon approval of his nomination by the National Assembly and be sworn in as Deputy President of Kenya. If the assumption of office occurs when there is still more than two and half years to the next Elections (August, 2022), then that person sworn in as Deputy President will be considered to have served a full term (section 149 (a) of the Constitution). Senator Gideon Moi of Baringo is considered a possible replacement for Ruto and is a close friend of Uhuru Kenyatta.

WILL THERE BE A KALENJIN REBELLION AGAINST JUBILEE?

There are elements in the URP of Deputy President William Ruto that feel he has been short changed in the Jubilee Coalition and the original agreement for fifty/fifty sharing of posts was not honoured as well as the suspension of three Cabinet Secretaries as well as some of Ruto’s staff on allegation of corruption in 2015.
Some of these elements went as far as to challenge Ruto to stand against Uhuru in 2017, a suggestion that Ruto has already dismissed. If Ruto intends to stand for the Presidency in 2022, he needs to have Kikuyu and Meru ethnic groups as well as others in the Jubilee Coalition. Kalenjins will not take the risk of missing out on power that a Ruto presidency can bring in 2022. This is one of the reasons Ruto has been pushing for dissolutions of the parties in the Jubilee Coalition and replacement by a single party, the Jubilee Party (JP).
Ruto hopes that the Kikuyu ethnic group will be tied down in JP and have no choice but to support him in 2022. Any Kalenjin leader who is seen to have even have a hint of supporting CORD may not be re-elected in 2017. The short lived “rebellion” of Bomet Governor Isaac Rutto in 2014 can be seen in this context.
Uhuru should expect more demands from the URP side of the coalition as they know he cannot be re-elected without their support. He will need Ruto to tame the URP elements that are not happy with the current situation if he hopes to be re-elected in 2017.

CONCLUSION

Jubilee’s “Tyranny of Numbers” only exists in the National Assembly due to the large number of new constituencies created in the Rift Valley and North-Eastern Regions, but whose population is low. It does not translate to a huge voter base. It’s like sitting on a two legged stool when a three legged stool is more stable. Jubilee has no choice but to remain a coalition and embark on luring part of Western Region and/or the lower Eastern Region into its fold if it wants to win re-election in 2017.
If re-elected, Uhuru will spend his second term building his legacy like the completion of the Standard Gauge Railway, the Greenfield Airport terminal at JKIA, the Lamu Seaport and transport corridor, the School Laptop and electrification; and reducing the terrorist threat to Kenya.
Above all Devolution remains Kenya’s greatest success story and a model for other African counties and ensuring its full implementation will be Uhuru’s best legacy.

25th August, 2015
© 2015 STAN OYUNGA

25th August, 2015
© 2015 STAN OYUNGA

REPORT-8A-2017-COALITION-VOTER-ESTIMATE-CORD-VS-JUBILEE.xls (258 downloads)
REPORT-8B-2017-COALITION-VOTER-ESTIMATE-CORD-VS-JUBILEE-50%-LUHYA.xls (243 downloads)
REPORT-8C-2017-COALITION-VOTER-ESTIMATE-CORD-VS-JUBILEE-WIPER.xls (245 downloads)

ROAD TO KENYA ELECTIONS 2017: CAN THIS SOFTWARE PREDICT THE WINNER?

By Stan Oyunga (stanoyunga@yahoo.com)

INTRODUCTION
In exactly two years from now (August 2017), Kenyans would have re-elected Uhuru Kenyatta for a second term as President or would have shown him the door and made history as the first country in East Africa to have replaced an incumbent President; or the leading Presidential candidate would have failed to garner the 50% +1 figure required to be declared elected and Kenyans would be preparing for a run-off Presidential Election for the first time.
Whether it will be Uhuru Kenyatta or Raila Odinga or another person altogether who will emerge the winner is hard to predict and opinion polls have proved inaccurate in both the 2007 and 2013 Presidential Elections.
For the first time in history of Presidential elections in Kenya, a software has been developed to do just that: predict the winner of the 2017 Presidential Elections. By using past voting patterns, voter turn-out, projected voter registration and ethnic block voting data, the software has attempted to predict the winner using a baseline data of 80% voter registration and 80% voter turn-out.
Since not all counties will achieve 80% or even 90% voter turn-out, the ultimate winner will depend which candidate can attain the highest voter turn-out in his stronghold. It will also depend if the two main coalitions can retain their core supporters and ethnic block voters.
The Kenya Election Database Version 2.0, is an Election Data Analysis and Strategic Election Planning software that holds full results of Kenya General Elections since 1969, population census for 1999 and 2009 and population projection for 2015 and 2017. It is still the only single source of Kenya General Election Results Data in the market.

COALTION POLITICS

The winner of any free and fair elections in most African countries depends on certain parameters such as Ethnic group block voting, political parties/coalitions and voter turn-out.
The ruling party/coalition usually emerges the winner due to the influence of the incumbency but recent elections in Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria has shown that this is not always the case, when the election is deemed to be free and fair.
Since 2002, the two party/coalition system has been evident in Kenya and has worked well except for the disastrous 2007 Presidential Elections. There is a clear pattern in Ethnic block voting and coalition politics that has created coalition strongholds since no single ethnic group has the numbers to produce a winning Presidential candidate. Refer to my blog “Road to Kenya Election 2017: Who will have the numbers in 2017?” found at www.kenyaelectiondatabase.co.ke .
The two main coalitions in Kenya, the Jubilee Coalition and the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), control 18 and 19 counties respectively which can be considered their strongholds. 10 other counties are considered “Fifty/Fifty” (or “battle grounds”) where both coalitions are more or else equal:-

[table id=44 /]

[table id=45 /]

[table id=46 /]

There is no guarantee that both coalitions will hold together for the next two years but it is likely they will and the 2017 General Elections will be a repeat of the 2013 Elections and remain a two horse race. Only one or two dramatic watershed events can alter the makeup of the coalitions and lead to a paradigm shift (e.g. death of a Presidential candidate or Coalition principal/party leader or conviction of Deputy President William Ruto by the International Criminal Court in The Hague).

2017 REGISTERED VOTER PROJECTION

The first step in attempting to predict the results of the 2017 Presidential Elections is to project the number of eligible voters by county as shown in the tables above. To achieve this the software first projects each county’s population for 2017 (based on average annual growth rate of 2.4%) then calculates the number of voters at 40% of the projected population, since the average percentage of Kenyans who register to vote is 40% (equal to 80% of adult population).
The software has calculated Kenya’s population in 2017 to be 48.3 million and estimated the eligible voters at 19.3 million if 80% of adult voter registration is achieved. Some counties may exceed 80% and some may be below, hence the 80% is considered average for all 47 counties.

2017 PROJECTED VOTES

The next step is to project the number of votes each coalition may receive in the 2017 Presidential Elections by county. To do this the data from the software was transferred to a spreadsheet and the projected votes was calculated as a percentage of what the coalition received in the 2013 Presidential Elections for each county. This assumes that the voting pattern in 2017 will follow that of 2013, unless there is a paradigm shift in coalition politics as explained above.
80% voter turn-out was taken as the baseline for each county considering the turn-out for the 2013 General Elections was 86%, the highest in Kenya’s history. The constituency turn-out for the 2013 Presidential Elections ranged from a high of 96% (Rangwe) to a low of 58% (Kilifi North).
For example Nairobi is expected to have a projected population of 3.9 million in 2017 and estimated voter registration of 1.5 million (40%) and voter turn-out of 1.2 million (80%). CORD’s valid vote share in 2013 was 51% while Jubilee’s was 47%, hence CORD’s projected vote in Nairobi will be 640,739 and Jubilee’s will be 590,485. This figure is on the lower side since some constituencies in Nairobi record voter registration of above 100% of adult population due to non-residence of these constituencies coming to register there (voter importation). They include Starehe, Makadara, Embakasi East and Roysambu.
The spreadsheet cell entries are as follows:-
COL H: 2017 Population Projection
COL I: 2017 Registered Voter Estimate (40% of H)
COL J: 2017 Projected Votes (80% of I)
COL K: CORD Valid Vote % in 2013
COL L: Jubilee Valid Vote % in 2013
COL M: Total Valid Vote % in 2013 (K + L)
COL N: CORD Projected Votes (K% of J)
COL O: Jubilee Projected Votes (L% of J)
COL P: Total Votes (N + O)
To obtain the projected votes for the 2017 Presidential Elections I have prepared 4 spreadsheets using the above formulae:-
1) Report 3A-COUNTIES PROJECTED VOTES IF TURN-OUT-80%-ALL
2) Report 3B-COUNTIES PROJECTED VOTES IF TURN-OUT-80%-CORD
3) Report 3C-COUNTIES PROJECTED VOTES IF TURN-OUT-80%-JUBILEE
4) Report 3D-COUNTIES PROJECTED VOTES IF TURN-OUT-80%-FIFTY-FIFTY

2017 PROJECTED RESULTS

According to the spreadsheets which are attached to this blog, if the 2017 Presidential Elections has a 80% turn-out, then the CORD candidate is projected to receive 8.7 million against 7.1 million for the Jubilee candidate, if all 47 counties record a 80% voter registration. If any coalition fails to achieve 80% voter registration and/or 80% turn-out then the projected votes will reduce accordingly or even increase if 90% or higher is achieved for both parameters.
Total projected votes for 2017 is 16 million compared to 12.3 million in 2013. Total projected registered voters will be 19.3 million compared to 14.3 million in 2013 against IEBC voter registration target of 18 million. The IEBC wants to register 8 million new voters by 2017 in order to reach its target of 23 million voters. But the software has projected that IEBC will register only 6 million new voters by the 2017 General Elections

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this software and the spreadsheets is to assist Election Managers in planning the 2017 Presidential campaigns and setting targets that can assure their respective candidates victory. Cutting deals to lure ethnic block votes to their coalitions will be the norm.
It is also to assist Kenyans to see the importance of registering as voters and turning out to vote. CORD strongholds had more potential eligible voters then Jubilee’s but due to failure to register as voters and turn-out in large number to vote in the 2013 General Elections, CORD lost, leading to the infamous “Tyranny of Numbers”.
Overall a total of 5.6 million Kenyans in the strongholds of the 2 top candidates, did not take part in the 2013 Elections, out of which 2 million were registered to vote but did not for various reasons (no one has done any research as to why registered voters do not vote on the actual voting day), 3.6 million did not register at all for various reasons including lack of identity cards but some choose not to do so (boycott?) or lack of interest (millennials or generation y?).
Out of the 2 million registered voters who did not vote in the 2013 General Elections, 1.2 million were from CORD strongholds and over 700,000 were from Jubilee strongholds.
Out of the 3.6 million eligible voters who did not register, 2.4 million were from CORD strongholds and 1.2 million were from Jubilee strongholds.

21-AUG-2015

© 2015 STAN OYUNGA
REPORT-3A-COUNTIES-ELECTION-PROJECTED-VOTES-IF-TURN-OUT-80%-ALL1.xls (257 downloads)
REPORT-3B-COUNTIES-ELECTION-PROJECTED-VOTES-IF-TURN-OUT-80%-CORD1.xls (241 downloads)
REPORT-3C-COUNTIES-ELECTION-PROJECTED-VOTES-IF-TURN-OUT-80%-JUBILEE1.xls (248 downloads)
REPORT-3D-COUNTIES-ELECTION-PROJECTED-VOTES-IF-TURN-OUT-80%-FIFTY-FIFTY.xls (242 downloads)

ROAD TO KENYA ELECTIONS 2017: WHO WILL HAVE THE NUMBERS IN 2017?

By Stan Oyunga (stanoyunga@yahoo.com)

INTRODUCTION
In the 2013 General Elections, which had the highest turn-out of any election in Kenya’s history (85.91 %), 2 million registered voters did not vote and 7.8 million eligible voters did not even register. That is a total eligible voter loss of 9.8 million (45 % of Adult population did not vote in 2013). Despite setting a voter registration target of 18.2 million Kenyans for the 2013 General Elections, the Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), managed to register only 14.3 million voters (78.6 % of target), by 18th December, 2012. The incremental difference between the 2007 and 2013 Elections was only 56,353, compared with 3,845,030 between the 2002 and 2007 Elections.

IEBC is now targeting to register 11.4 million Kenyans in order to reach a target of 25.7 million eligible voters before the 2017 General Elections, but this figure may be unrealistic as it’s based on the assumption that Kenya ‘s projected population would be 51.4 million in 2017. The actual projected population would be 48.3 million based on average annual growth rate of 2.4 %. Hence since adults make up 50 % of Kenya‘s population, and an average of 80 % of adults usually register as voters, the estimated voters would be 19.3 million (See Report 1A). If 90 % voter registration is achieved, then the figure rises to 21.7 million (See Report 2A). So IEBC should expect to register only 5 million new voters if 80 % registration is achieved or 7.3 million if 90 % is achieved.

2017 VOTER REGISTRATION ESTIMATE

In order to estimate the voter registration in 2017 by county and coalition, I used the Kenya Election Database Version 2.0, an Election Data Analysis and Strategic Election Planning software. From data extracted from the software, it was possible to prepare excel spreadsheets that show voter estimates at 80 % registration for all counties (Report 1A), for CORD strongholds (Report 1B), Jubilee strongholds (Report 1C), and Fifty/Fifty counties (Report 1D). I have also prepared spreadsheets to show voter estimates at 90 % registration for all counties (Report 2A), for CORD strongholds (Report 2B), Jubilee strongholds (Report 2C), and Fifty/Fifty counties (Report 2D).

County strongholds were determined by which coalition garnered the majority votes (above 66.6 %) in that county in the 2013 Presidential Elections. Where both coalitions failed to get a majority, then that county was designated “Fifty/Fifty”. For example in Narok County, the 5 out of the 6 constituencies elected an M.P. affiliated to the Jubilee coalition, but Raila Odinga of CORD had more votes than Uhuru Kenyatta of Jubilee (50 % against 46 %), hence making Narok a “Fifty/Fifty” county. Although Vihiga County was won by Musalia Mudavadi of Amani coalition, it is unlikely that he will stand again in 2017; hence Vihiga was placed under CORD.

[table id=38 /]

[table id=39 /]

[table id=40 /]

2017 VOTER REGISTRATION ESTIMATE IF 80 % REGISTRATION
According to Report 1A, the 2017 population projection for “Fifty/Fifty” counties is 9.4 million and voter registration estimate is 3.7 million if 80 % registration is achieved. CORD’s share is 51 % (1.9 million) hence total estimated voters are 10.3 million. Jubilee’s share is 46 % (1.7 million) hence total estimated voters are 8.8 million as shown on table below.

[table id=41 /]

Hence out of the 19.2 million estimated registered voters in 2017, 10.3 million will come from CORD counties and CORD supporters in Fifty/Fifty counties and 8.8 million will come from Jubilee counties and Jubilee supporters in “Fifty/Fifty” counties. Hence CORD estimated voters will exceed Jubilee’s by 1.5 million.
2017 VOTER REGISTRATION ESTIMATE IF 90 % REGISTRATION
According to Report 2A, the 2017 population projection for “Fifty/Fifty” counties is 9.4 million and voter registration estimate is 4.1 million if 90 % registration is achieved. CORD’s share is 51 % (2.1 million) hence total estimated voters are 11.6 million. Jubilee’s share is 46 % (1.9 million) hence total estimated voters are 9.9 million as shown on table below.

[table id=42 /]

Hence out of the 21.6 million estimated registered voters in 2017, 11.6 million will come from CORD counties and CORD supporters in Fifty/Fifty counties and 9.9 million will come from Jubilee counties and Jubilee supporters in “Fifty/Fifty” counties. Hence CORD estimated voters will exceed Jubilee’s by 1.7 million.
Please note that not all voters in a coalition’s county stronghold will vote for that particular coalition but the aim of these reports is estimate how many voters are expected to be on the IEBC’s official Principal Register of Voters by the date of the 2017 General Elections on 8th August, 2017.
NEW “COMING OF AGE” VOTERS
According to the 2009 population census, there were 7.2 million Kenyans aged 11-18 out of which 3.4 million would have reached the age of 18 by 2012 and able to register as voters. But due to the low number of voters registered by December, 2012 (14.3 million out of target of 18 million), it seems most were not registered. Since the IEBC does not give the voter’s age when registering, it not possible to know the exact number.
Hence by 2017, it is estimated that about 5.8 million Kenyans who had not turned 18 by 2009 will have done so to enable then to register. Due to mortality and other factors only 80% of the 7.2 million will be eligible to register but some may not do so by either choice or delay in issuing ID cards.

[table id=43 /]

DIASPORA VOTERS

The number of Kenyans in the Diaspora is estimated at 3 million, mostly in the United States, Britain, Germany, South Africa and United Arab Emirates. In the 2013 Elections only Kenyans living in Uganda and Tanzania were allowed to register and vote. Although the 2010 Constitution allows dual citizenship, the logistics and legal provisions led to the IEBC in abandoning plans for Diaspora registration and voting in 2013, except in East African. It is not clear if these problems will have been overcome by 2017. But the Diaspora is expected to have little impact in the voter registration for the 2017 General Elections, although the IEBC has started to collect data on Kenyans in the Diaspora on their website- www.iebc.or.ke
There is an estimated 500,000 Kenyans in the United States, 150,000 in Britain and 50,000 in the United Arab Emirates. About 70 % of the estimated 3 million Kenyans in the Diaspora are adults thus eligible to register and vote.

CONCLUSION

As long as voter registration is voluntary, it will be impossible to achieve 90 % voter registration and even this will be hard to attain unless the IEBC and political parties/coalitions came up with strategies to ensure most eligible Kenyans register. A radical solution is to make voter registration and voting compulsory like in Australia (see my blog “Road to Elections 2017: Should voting be made compulsory?” posted at www.kenyaelectiondatabase.co.ke ).
Although CORD has an advantage when it comes to eligible voting numbers in its strongholds, this will not guarantee it victory in 2017 if many do not register and vote in order to avoid the infamous “Tyranny of Numbers” by Jubilee in 2013. Coalition in-fighting may also lead to a break-up of either of the coalitions or shifting support from one to the other.
© 2015 STAN OYUNGA

REPORTS
REPORT-1A-COUNTIES-80%-VOTER-ESTIMATE-FOR-2017-ALL.xls (450 downloads)
REPORT-1B-COUNTIES-80%-VOTER-ESTIMATE-FOR-2017-CORD.xls (371 downloads)
REPORT-1C-COUNTIES-80%-VOTER-ESTIMATE-FOR-2017-JUBILEE.xls (353 downloads)
REPORT-1D-COUNTIES-80%-VOTER-ESTIMATE-FOR-2017-FIFTY-FIFTY.xls (394 downloads)
REPORT-2A-COUNTIES-90%-VOTER-ESTIMATE-FOR-2017-ALL.xls (347 downloads)
REPORT-2B-COUNTIES-90%-VOTER-ESTIMATE-FOR-2017-CORD.xls (348 downloads)
REPORT-2C-COUNTIES-90%-VOTER-ESTIMATE-FOR-2017-JUBILEE.xls (347 downloads)
REPORT-2D-COUNTIES-90%-VOTER-ESTIMATE-FOR-2017-FIFTY-FIFTY.xls (354 downloads)

ROAD TO KENYA ELECTIONS 2017: THE REALITY OF ETHNIC BLOCK VOTES

By Stan Oyunga (stanoyunga@yahoo.com)

INTRODUCTION
Recently, in May 2015, an M.P. from the Western region called on members of the Luhya ethnic group to register 7 million voters in order for one of their own to ascend to the Presidency in 2017. The reality of achieving such a high voter registration is impossible as the projected population of the Luhyas in 2017 will be 6.6 million with an estimated 3 million eligible voters (40 % of projected population). Using the Kenya Election Database Version 2.0, an Election Data Analysis and Strategic Election Planning software, for the first time it is possible to reveal the projected population and estimated eligible voters of each of Kenya’s 43 ethnic groups. It will also be possible to estimate each of the two main coalitions’ eligible voters in 2017.

HISTORY OF ETHNIC BLOCK VOTING IN KENYA

1992

The 1992 Presidential Elections, Kenya’s first contested since independence in 1963, did not have distinct ethnic vote block voting, as the incumbent, Daniel arap Moi of KANU was facing a divided opposition. There were 3 opposition parties: Ford-Kenya, Ford-Asili and the Democratic Party (DP) who sponsored, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenneth Matiba and Mwai Kibaki respectively.
Due to the divided opposition, Moi won with only 35.99 % of the National vote, the lowest ever attained by a winner of a Presidential Election in Kenya. Matiba was second with 25.76 % (including 38.5 % from Western Province), Kibaki was 3rd with 19.13 % (including 49.63 % from Eastern Province) and Odinga was fourth with 17.23 %, mostly from his Luo Nyanza stronghold.
Moi got votes mainly from his Kalenjin stronghold in Rift Valley, and from Coast, North-Eastern and Western Provinces. The Kikuyu ethnic vote was divided between Matiba and Kibaki, both Kikuyus with Matiba also getting votes from part of the Luhyas and Kibaki from part of the Kambas. Hence in 1992, the Kalenjin and Luo were the only ethnic groups to vote as a block.

1997

The ethnic block voting for Presidential Elections in Kenya was most prominent in the 1997 Elections, when each of Kenya’s five main ethnic groups had a candidate standing. The Kalenjin had the incumbent, Daniel arap Moi of KANU who won by getting 40 % of the National vote, the Kikuyu voted for Mwai Kibaki of DP who got 30% and emerged 2nd, the Luo had Raila Odinga of NDP who got 10.81 % and finished 3rd. The Luhya had Christopher Kijana Wamalwa of Ford-K who got 8.19 % and finished 4th; and the Kamba had Charity Ngilu of SDP with 7.91 % and finished 5th. 11 other candidates managed only 1.73 %. Both the Luhya and Kamba divided their ethnic votes between Moi, Wamalwa (Luhya) and Ngilu (Kamba).
Daniel arap Moi of KANU was the only candidate who achieved more than 25 % of votes in 5 provinces, failing in Nairobi, Nyanza and Central. He had broad support of other ethnic groups outside the Kalenjin stronghold of Rift Valley, enabling him to be re-elected. Kenyans learnt their lesson from the fractured ethnic block voting of 1997, where each of the 5 main ethnic groups presented one of their own to contest the Presidential elections, and it has not been repeated. All presidential elections thereafter have been between two major candidates (2 horse races).

2002

The 2002 Presidential Elections were the first without ethnic block voting where the 2 main candidates were from the same ethnic group, the Kikuyu. The opposition learnt the lessons of 1992 and 1997 that in order to defeat KANU, the ruling party, they had to unite and so by formed the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC).
Mwai Kibaki of Narc won the 2002 Elections with a landslide of 62.21 % against Uhuru Kenyatta of KANU who got 31.31 %, hence ending KANU’s 40 year rule. For the first time, Kenyan voted for a Presidential candidate irrespective of their ethnic group. For example in the Luo stronghold of Nyanza, a Luo (James Orengo of SDP) received only 1.1 % compared with Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu who got 61.3 %.
The Kikuyu vote was split due to 2 candidates from the same ethnic group while the Kalenjin voted as a block for Uhuru Kenyatta of KANU due to the influence of the former President, Daniel arap Moi, hence voting for a non-Kalenjin candidate for the first time. The Luhya voted as a block for the first time and even made history by voting out a sitting Vice-President, Musalia Mudavadi of KANU, who lost his Sabatia seat.

2007

In the 2007 Presidential Elections, coalition ethnic block voting emerged, where 3 main ethnic groups (Luhya, Kalenjin and Luo) combined under the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and sponsored Raila Odinga against the Kikuyu under the Party of National Unity (PNU), which sponsored the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki.
The Kamba who were originally part of the coalition that formed ODM, but due to a dispute as who would be the flag bearer, it sponsored one of their own, Kalonzo Musyoka under the ODM-Kenya party, which turned to have grave consequences for Kenya.
The results of the 2007 Presidential were disputed amid claims of ballot box stuffing and vote tallying fraud at the National Tallying Centre in Nairobi. The announcement that Mwai Kibaki of PNU had won the Elections resulted in Kenya’s worst political crisis and acts of violence that led to 1,300 deaths and displacement of over 600,000 people. On 28th February, 2008, after international mediation, an agreement was reached to form a Grand Coalition Government, with Mwai Kibaki as President, Raila Odinga as Prime Minister and Kalonzo Musyoka, as Vice-President.
Had the original ODM-K not spilt into ODM and ODM-K, then they would have had enough votes to deny Mwai Kibaki of PNU, his second term as President. The results as released by the defunct Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) had Kibaki getting 4.57 million voters (47 %) against Odinga’s 4.35 million (44 %). Musyoka got 879,899 (9 %) and was 3rd. His decision to stand alone denied the original ODM-K victory as combination of ODM and ODM-K votes was 5.23 million, which would have been 654,725 more than what Kibaki got.
Musyoka got votes mainly from his Kamba ethnic group but the lesson of 1997 was not learnt: a Presidential candidate cannot solely depend on his own ethnic group to be elected President. Even Mwai Kibaki got votes of more than 32 % in all Provinces except Nyanza and did not depend on only the Kikuyu.
The Luhya vote was split with the Bukusu sub-ethnic group of Bungoma voting for Kibaki of PNU, hence giving him 32 % of Western Province and the Maragoli and other sub-ethnic groups voting for Odinga of ODM, giving him 66 %. Again, they made history for the 2nd Election running by rejecting a sitting Vice-President, with Mody Awori of PNU losing his Funyula seat.

2013

In the 2013 Elections, the coalition ethnic block voting continued this time with the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin combing to form the Jubilee Coalition. It sponsored Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu as their Presidential Elections under The National Alliance party (TNA) with William Ruto, a Kalenjin his running mate, under the United Republican Party (URP). It was the first time that Kikuyus and Kalenjins have voted together in a Presidential Election. It also had the Mt. Kenya (Meru, Tharaka, Embu and Mbeere) ethnic block vote that always votes with the Kikuyu.
The Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) sponsored as its Presidential candidate, Raila Odinga, a Luo under ODM with Kalonzo Musoka, a Kamba, as his running mate under Wiper Democratic Movement-Kenya (WDM-K). Once again, a dispute within the ODM resulted in a breakaway candidate, this time Musalia Mudavadi was sponsored by the United Democratic Front (UDF) after falling out with the ODM, where he had been Raila Odinga’s deputy. Hence the CORD coalition was depending on the Luhya, Luo, Kamba, Kisii and Mijikenda ethnic block votes.
Since Mudavadi came from the Maragoli, the second largest sub-ethnic group of the Luhya, it had the effect of splitting the Luhya ethnic block vote, which was the second largest in Kenya after the Kikuyu.
Realising the importance of the Luhya ethnic block vote, the Jubilee coalition approached Mudavadi’s UDF to join it and the possibility of Mudavadi being the flag bearer was mooted, but was later dropped. Uhuru Kenyatta revealed he had been misled to have Mudavadi as the Jubilee’s Presidential candidate by “unknown forces”. Kenyatta was then nominated as Jubilee’s flag-bearer. Mudavai felt betrayed, claiming he had signed an agreement to join Jubilee and become the Presidential candidate.
Mudavadi’s candidature resulted in the split of the Luhya ethnic vote, with most Maragolis who dominated Vihiga and Kakamega County, voting for Mudavadi, but he won only in Vihiga and came second in Kakamega, Bungoma and Busia. Since 1992, the Luhyas have never voted as a block in any Presidential Elections except in 2002 and more so the Bukusu (the largest sub-ethnic group) and the Maragoli (the 2nd largest).
In the end, Jubilee did not need the Luhya ethnic votes as Uhuru Kenyatta won with 6.1 million (50.07 %), followed by Raila Odinga with 5.3 million (43.31 %) and Musalia Mudavadi with 483,981 (3.93 %). The difference between Kenyatta and Raila was 832,887 hence Mudavadi’s votes would have only reduced the difference to 348,906, hence Kenyatta would still have won but a run-off would have been necessary.
Jubilee’s victory was mainly due the fact that voters from the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups registered and voted in greater numbers than those of CORD. (Refer to my blog “Tyranny of Numbers-is it a double-edged sword?” at www.kenyaelectiondatabase.co.ke ).

2017 ETHNIC GROUP VOTER POTENTIAL
By using the 2009 census results for Kenya’s 43 ethnic groups, and then projecting their population in 2017 (based on average annual growth of 2.4 %), the Kenya Election Database can display the estimated voter potential (based on 40 % of 2017 projected population) for each ethnic group. The results are displayed on an Excel spreadsheet (see Report 5A).
Kenya’s projected ethnic group (excluding non-citizens) population in 2017 will be 47 million. If there is an 80 % voter registration, then the potential voters will be 18.8 million, but if it’s 90% then potential voters will be 21.1 million. Since adults (18 years or over) make 50 % of Kenya’s population, and not all of them register as voters for various reasons, 40 % is taken as the average of Kenya’s population that registers as voters (80 % of projected adult population in 2017). If the voter registration reaches 45 % of the projected population, then it’s 90 % of the projected adult population in 2017.
In order to determine the ethnic group voter support for each of Kenya’s two main coalitions (Jubilee and CORD), each ethnic group is allocated a coalition based on how they voted in 2013 and a colour code (Jubilee-Red or CORD-Blue). Where an ethnic group voted for both coalitions on an almost equal basis (e.g. Maasai and Somalia) then they appear as “Fifty/Fifty” under coalition and colour is green. Note that not all members of an ethnic group will vote for a particular coalition even when the majority do so but their votes will not likely affect the support of that coalition (e.g. Luhya and Kisii).
Since Mudavadi’s Amani coalition got most of its votes from the Luhya ethnic group and more so from his Maragoli sub-ethnic group; hence the Luhya ethnic group has been placed under CORD. Given his humiliating loss and 3rd place finish in 2013, it is unlikely that Mudavadi will stand again as a Presidential candidate in 2017.
The ethnic groups are ranked by 2009 population with Kikuyu ranked 1st (6.6 million) and the Konso ranked 43rd (1,758). Note that sub-ethnic group are included in the main ethnic groups, e.g. Kipsigis and Pokot are included under Kalenjin; and Giriama and Digo under Mijikenda. The Kenya Election Database gives the 2009 census and 2017 population projection for each of Kenya’s 79 sub-ethnic groups.
The “Big Five” main ethnic groups comprising the Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo and Kamba make up 64 % of Kenya’s citizen population hence can influence the results of any Presidential elections. Out of these “Big Five”, the Kikuyu (8.2 million population projection in 2017) and Kalenjin (6.2 million) support the Jubilee coalition while the Luhya (6.6 million), Luo (5 million) and Kamba (4.8 million) support the CORD coalition. The next 6 ethnic groups in ranking account for 26 % of the Kenya citizen population: Kenya Somali (2.9 million), Kisii (2.7 million), Mijikenda (2.4 million), Meru (2 million), Turkana (1.2 million) and Maasai (1 million).
Hence the top 11 ranked ethnic groups listed below will have a projected population of more than 43 million in 2017, accounting for more than 90 % of Kenya’s citizen population. Their estimated voter potential will be 17.4 million if 80 % voter registration is achieved or 19.6 million if 90 % is achieved. Whichever coalition controls the majority of the top 11 ethnic group will have a good chance to win the 2017 Presidential elections as long they achieve a high voter registration and turn-out.
The table below shows that out of the top 11 ethnic groups, Jubilee controls only 3 ethnic groups with total estimated voter of 6.6 million if 80 % registration is achieved while CORD controls 5 ethnic groups with total estimated voter of 9.2 million. The Maasai and the Kenyan Somali are considered “Fifty/Fifty” as they usually vote for both coalitions. They have a total estimated voter of 1.1 million and 421,148 respectively if 80 % registration is achieved.

TOP 11 ETHNIC GROUP POTENTIAL VOTERS-2017

[table id=36 /]

Note: The Somali and Turkana population census figures may need verification after the 2009 census as the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) raised a red flag on figures from 8 Districts in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Turkana.
In order to calculate the total coalition ethnic group voter potential for 2017, half of the total voter potential of the “Fifty/Fifty” ethnic group have been added to both Jubilee and CORD totals. While it is possible that the loyalty of an ethnic group may shift before the 2017 Elections, due to Kenya’s coalition politics, the current scenario is summarized in the table below:

[table id=37 /]

CORD’s ethnic group estimated potential voters for 2017 will be 10.7 million if 80 % adult registration is achieved or 12.1 million if 90 % is achieved (See Report 5B). Jubilee’s ethnic group estimated potential voters will be 8 million if 80 % adult registration or 9 million if 90 % is achieved (See Report 5C). Hence CORD’s total ethnic group potential voters will exceed Jubilee’s by 2.7 million if 80 % adult voter registration or 3 million if 90 % is achieved.

CONCLUSION
The above reports do not mean that CORD is going to win the 2017 Presidential Elections as the winner will be the coalition that will mobilize its supports to register AND vote in large numbers. Ethnic block voting is a reality in Kenya politics and it is the only guaranteed block vote in order to win any election.
There is no youth, women, Christian or Muslim block vote and most Kenyans will always identify with their ethnic group. That is why a youth in Kisumu will always vote for a CORD candidate and a youth in Kiambu will vote for a Jubliee candidate. That is why Charity Ngilu, one of only 2 women candidates in the 1997 Presidential Elections could not get the bulk of the women votes.
2002 still remains a watershed year, when for the first time Kenyans did not care of the ethnicity of the Presidential candidates and proved that no single ethnic group can produce its own President and coalition politics will remain part of Kenya’s political landscape.

CLICK ON THE REPORTS BELOW TO DOWNLOAD

REPORT-5A-ETHNIC-GROUP-POTENTIAL-VOTERS-2017-ALL.xlsx (505 downloads)
REPORT-5B-ETHNIC-GROUP-POTENTIAL-VOTERS-2017-CORD.xlsx (432 downloads)
REPORT-5C-ETHNIC-GROUP-POTENTIAL-VOTERS-2017-JUBILEE.xlsx (408 downloads)

© 2015 STAN OYUNGA

ROAD TO ELECTIONS 2017: SHOULD VOTING BE MADE COMPULSORY?

By Stan Oyunga (stanoyunga@yahoo.com)

INTRODUCTION

Despite setting a voter registration target of 18.2 million Kenyans for the 2013 General Elections, the Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), managed to register only 14.3 million voters (78.6 % of target), by 18th December, 2012. On the actualvoting day, 4th March, 2013, the turn-out was high, 85.71 %, (12.3 million votes cast in the Presidential Elections), but over 2 million registered voters did not vote.Hence total voter loss for the 2013 Presidential Elections was 6.1 million (not voted + not registered) according to the IEBC target of 18.2 million, which was 42 % of Kenya’s projected population of 43 million in 2013. This translates to 84 % of the adult population as adults make 50 % of Kenya’s population.Out of the projected adult population of 21.5 million in 2013, only 66.5 % registered as voters and 57.2 % actually voted in 2013. Hence about 5 million eligible voters (aged 18 and above) did not register as voters in order to take part in the 2013 General Elections. Some may have chosen not to register for personal reasons while others could not as they were missing valid identification documents or were waiting to be issued with ID cards.

Although the turn-out for the 2013 Presidential Elections was the highest in Kenya’s history, the incremental difference between the 2007 and 2013 Elections was only 56,353, compared with 3,845,030
between the 2002 and 2007 Elections.There were 6 basic reasons why eligible voters did not register as
voters for the 2013 General Elections:-

1) By choice-for personal, social or religious reason, including trauma after the 2007/2008 post-election violence.

2) Lack of identification documents e.g. identity card or passport.

3) Illness or physical impairment that made it difficult to access a registration centre before the deadline.

4) Detention by authorities due to imprisonment or remand.

5) Military or Para-military duties that restrict officers from registering (e.g. high insecurity zones).

6) Absence from Kenya during period of voter registration (including Kenyans in Diaspora except those in Uganda and Tanzania who were allowed to register/vote).

WHAT IS COMPULSORY VOTING?

Compulsory voting is a system in which electors are obliged to vote in elections or attend a polling place on voting day. If an eligible voter does not visit a polling station, he or she can be subject to a fine or custodial or non-custodial sentence (community service).

There are currently 31 countries that have laws for compulsory voting and 13 of these enforce these laws.

COUNTRIES WITH ENFORCED COMPULSORY VOTING

  • ARGENTINA (Not compulsory for 16-17 and over 70 years of age)

    AUSTRALIA

    BRAZIL (Not compulsory for 16-17 and over 70 years of age)

    CYPRUS

    ECUADOR

    LIECHENSTIEN

    LUEMBOURG (Voluntary for those aged over 70)

    MALAYSIA

    NORTH KOREA

    NAURA

    PERU (Voluntary for those aged over 70)

    SINGAPORE

    URUGUAY

    COUNTRIES WITH NON-ENFORCED COMPULSORY VOTING

    BELGIUM

    BOLIVIA

    COSTA RICA

    DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

    DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

    EGYPT

    FRANCE (Senate only)

    GABON

    GREECE

    GUATEMALA

    HONDURAS

    LEBANON (Men only)

    LIBYA

    MEXICO

    PANAMA

    PARAGUAY

    THAILAND

    TURKEY

  • With the exception of North Korea, Libya, Egypt and DRC Congo, all the above countries are known for have carried out recent free and fair democratic elections.

    WHY IT MAY BE NECESSARY IN KENYA

    The main reason for compulsory voting is that it is considered a civic duty, similar to taxation, civic duties, compulsory education or military service.It also helps to produce more stable governments with a higher degree of legitimacy and genuine mandate to govern due to the higher voter turn-out. The winning candidate and political party represent a majority of the voting population, not just the politically motivated who would have voted anyway.

    It also puts the onus on the country’s electoral body to ensure that all eligible persons are registered to vote and are issued with the relevant identification documents. Disenfranchisement of any class of eligible voter is not permitted. The common practice by candidates and political parties of bribing eligible voters to register and/or to vote will not be necessary.

    In Kenya’s case a large number of voters who had attained 18 years of age could not take part in the 2013 General Elections due to lack of identity cards, even when some had interim registration documents (“waiting paper”), they were not allowed to register and vote.

    Compulsory voting also reduces cases of vote rigging or manipulation as the high turn-out (usually between 90-95%) makes it difficult for ballot stuffing and vote tallying fraud as the votes cast cannot exceed number of registered voters for a polling station, Ward, Constituency or County.

    The results of the 2007 Presidential elections were disputed due to suspected ballot vote stuffing and voter tallying manipulation, which resulted in post-election violence that killed over 1,300 people and
    displaced 600,000. Compulsory voting would have made ballot vote stuffing minimal and voter tallying manipulation difficult.

    The following table clearly shows that voter turn-out for Presidential elections in Kenya since 1992, with average turn-out of 67.30 %, with 2002 having the lowest at 57.18% and 2013 the highest at 85.91%.
    Ironically, 2002 is still considered the best ever organised elections in Kenya’s history, when KANU’s 40 year rule was ended by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). But 4.4 million registered voters
    did not vote in the 2002 Elections and a massive 5 million eligible voters did not even register. That is a total eligible voter loss of 9.4 million (2 out of 3 Adults did not vote in 2002).

    In 2013, which had the highest turn-out of any election in Kenya’s history, 2 million registered voters did not vote and 7.8 million eligible voters did not even register. That is a total eligible voter loss
    of 9.8 million (45 % of Adult population did not vote in 2013).

    [table id=35 /]

    Source:www.idea.int

    ENFORCING COMPULSORY VOTING

    Amending the law to incorporate compulsory voting will not involving amending the 2010 Constitution as the right to register and vote by secret ballot is enshrined in Article 38 (3) (a) and (b).Only the Electoral Act, no. 24 of 2011 needs to be amended by the National Assembly, by amending section 3 (1) and (2) which currently reads:-

    “3. (1) An adult citizen shall exercise the right to vote specified in

    Article 38 (3) of the Constitution in accordance with this Act.

    (2) A citizen shall exercise the right to vote if the citizen is registered

    in the Principal Register of Voters.”

    After amending it will read as follows:-

    “3. (1) An adult citizen is required exercise the right to vote

    specified in Article 38 (3) of the Constitution in accordance with this

    Act.

    (2) A citizen is required to exercise the right to vote by being

    registered in the Principal Register of Voters.”

    Section 5 (3) relating to the registration of voters which currently

    reads as follows:-

    “(3) Any citizen of Kenya who has attained the age of eighteen years

    as evidenced by either a national identity card or a Kenyan passport

    and whose name is not in the register of voters shall be registered as

    a voter upon application, in the prescribed manner,”

    After amending it will read as follows:-

    “(3) Any citizen of Kenya who has attained the age of eighteen years

    as evidenced by either a national identity card or a Kenyan passport

    and whose name is not in the register of voters is required to be

    registered as a voter upon application, in the prescribed manner,”

    Section 56 of the Electoral Act that deals with offences related with

    registration of voters, can be amended to provide penalty for those

    who fail to register by adding a new subsection:-

    “56 (i) unless exempted by any regulation under this Act, any person

    liable to be registered as a voter under section 3 (2) and fails to apply

    for registration as a voter as required by section 5(3) of this Act;

    Commits an offence and is liable on conviction, to a fine not

    exceeding one million shillings and to imprisonment for a term not

    exceeding six years or to both; or if it is an offence under section 56

    (i), to a fine not exceeding ten thousand shillings or one month

    imprisonment in default.”

    Section 58 of the Electoral Act that deals with offences related to

    voting can be amended to provide penalty for those who fail to cast

    their votes during any elections or referendum by adding a new

    subsection:-

    “58 (q) unless exempted by any regulation under this Act, any person

    liable to vote under section 3 (1) of this Act and fails to cast his vote

    in any election or referendum, without reasonable excuse;

    Commits an offence and is liable on conviction, to a fine not

    exceeding one million shillings and to imprisonment for a term not

    exceeding six years or to both; or if it is an offence under section 58

    (q), to a fine not exceeding ten thousand shillings or one month

    imprisonment in default.”

    The penalty for both offences may seem high but it will act as deterrence and those who still do not want to register and/or vote will have an option of paying the fine. Voters who still do not want to vote despite being registered, due to personal or religious reasons, can still decide to leave their ballot papers blank as long as they place it in the respective ballot box. The vote will be treated as spoilt but he or she will not be committing an offence.

    The National Assembly can make regulations under the Elections Act to provide exemptions for adult citizens from being registered as voters and/or voting due to religious or special circumstances.Even if the offences are not enforced strictly, due to logistical and humanitarian reasons, the existence of the compulsory provisions will increase both voter registration and voter turn-out in future elections and can only be good for democracy in Kenya.

    © 2015 STAN OYUNGA

    THE TYRANNY OF NUMBERS: IS IT A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD?

    By Stan Oyunga (stanoyunga@yahoo.com)

    INTRODUCTION

    It’s more or less certain, unless something untoward happens, that Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga will once again face each other in a Presidential Election on Tuesday, 8th August, 2017.
    It will be 6th Presidential Elections since independence, with the incumbent, Uhuru Kenyatta standing in his 3rd Presidential Election and Raila Odinga in his 4th attempt.
    Kenyatta is expected to stand under the new Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP) that was registered in December, 2014 to take over parties that were in the Jubilee Coalition, The National Alliance (TNA), the United Republican Party (URP), and other small parties.
    Odinga is expected to stand on the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) ticket, part of the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD).
    Uhuru Kenyatta won the 2013 Presidential Elections by garnering 6.1 million votes (50.07%) against Raila Odinga’s 5.3 million (43.31%), out of the 12.3 million valid votes cast. The variance was 832,887.
    Although Odinga challenged the results by a petition in the Supreme Court, the Court upheld Uhuru’s victory by its landmark ruling on 30th March, 2013.
    Kenyatta’s victory was attributed to the so-called “tyranny of numbers”, where supporters of the Jubilee coalition had registered and turned up to vote in the 2013 General Elections in much larger numbers than those of the CORD coalition.

    Jubilee leaders are already boasting of winning the 2017 Presidential Elections, and even ruling Kenya for the next “20 years”, but can the Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP) repeat the 2013 victory, or will Uhuru Kenyatta make history by being the first incumbent President in East Africa to be defeated in a democratic election? Unless he wins, Uhuru will also make history by serving the shortest term of any Kenyan president, of only four years and four months. Kenya may also join Nigeria, Malawi, Somalia, Zambia, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire and Madagascar as the only African countries where incumbents have lost in democratic elections since 2000.
    In order to get the answers to these questions, I used the Kenya Election Database, an Election Data Analysis and Strategic Election Planning software (visit www.kenyaelectiondatabase.co.ke ) and the double-edged sword of the “tyranny of numbers” can now be revealed.
    There is no doubt Uhuru Kenyatta won the 2013 Presidential Elections, notwithstanding that it could have gone for a run-off, if the automated vote tallying system had not failed.
    The analysis detailed below will show that a combination of better voter registration and voter turn-out in Jubilee strongholds assured Kenyatta victory despite Raila Odinga winning more constituencies and counties. The ODM became the largest single party in the 11th Parliament with 78 elected seats followed by TNA with 72. But due to the pre-election coalition agreement with the URP, which won 62 elected seats, the Jubilee coalition became the largest coalition in Parliament, hence the infamous “tyranny of numbers”.
    Despite have more potential voters in its strongholds than Jubilee, the CORD coalition failed to take advantage of this to ensure most were registered by 18th December, 2012 and turned-up to vote on 4th March, 2013.

    2013 PRESIDENTAIL ELECTIONS: ODM VS TNA

    In the 2013 Presidential Elections, Uhuru Kenyatta of TNA won in 135 out of 291 constituencies while Raila Odinga of ODM won 153. Musalia Mudavadi of United Democratic Forum Party (UDF) won only 3. Kenyatta obtained 5.2 million votes from constituencies where he was winner out of the total of 6.1 million votes he got in the 2013 Elections. Out of 135 constituencies where Kenyatta won, 790,519 registered voters did not vote and an estimated 1.4 million did not register (based on IEBC targets).
    Odinga obtained 4.4 million votes from the 153 constituencies where he was winner, out of total of 5.3 million votes he got in 2013 Elections. Out of the 153 constituencies where he was winner, 1.2 million registered voters did not vote and an estimated 2.3 million did not register (based on IEBC targets). (See Report 7A).
    Hence while Kenyatta had a voter deficit of 2 .2 million from his strongholds, Odinga had a voter deficit of 3.5 million.

    [table id=33 /]

    Out of the 135 constituencies which Uhuru won, 72 had more than 5,000 potential voters who did not register (see Report 7B-TNA Not Reg ranking). Most of his unregistered potential voters were from semi-arid counties like Mandera, Wajir, West Pokot, Baringo, etc.
    Out of the 153 constituencies which Odinga won, 131 had more than 5,000 potential voters who did not register (see Report 7C-ODM Not Reg ranking). This report shows the constituencies where Odinga won and ranked from the highest with unregistered potential voters who did not register to the lowest. Most of his unregistered potential voters came from Turkana, Garissa, Kwale, Kilifi and Trans-Nzoia Counties.
    Kenyatta had 65 constituencies where he was the winner, that had more than 5,000 registered voters who did not vote, most of who were in Nairobi, Kiambu and Nakuru counties which have a high population (see Report 7D-TNA Not Voted ranking).
    Odinga had 95 constituencies where he was the winner, that had more than 5,000 registered voters who did not vote, most of who were in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kilifi, Machakos, Kwale Counties (see Report 7E-ODM Not Voted ranking). Only Nairobi and Mombasa have a high population.

    ODM VS TNA: VOTER DEFICIT AND NOT VOTED BY COUNTY

    In the 2013 Presidential Elections, Uhuru Kenyatta of TNA won in 20 counties, Raila Odinga of ODM won in 26 and Musalia Mudavadi of UDF won in only 1.
    In Coalition terms, Jubilee had 18 counties which were its stronghold and CORD had also 18 (stronghold is determined by the winning candidate garnering more than 66.6 % of valid votes). In 10 counties each Coalition had almost equal votes (Fifty/Fifty counties). The only county that was not won by either Jubilee or CORD was Vihiga which was won by Mudavadi of UDF (Amani coalition). In Report 7F (Voter Deficit ranking by County) Jubilee is shown in red, CORD is in blue and Fifty/Fifty counties are in green (Amani’s single county is in brown). It is obvious that CORD counties have the worst Voter Deficit ranking with 2.1 million potential voters not registered, with Turkana, Bungoma and Kakamega ranked worst. Mandera is ranked on top but this because its 2009 population census may have been manipulated hence may not reflect what was on the ground. The same may apply to Turkana. The Counties with the lowest Voter deficit are Nairobi, Kiambu, Nyeri, Muranga and Kirinyaga (most in Jubilee strongholds).
    In Report 7G (Not Voted ranking by County), the Nairobi, Mombasa, Kilifi and Kakamega (most CORD strongholds) had the worst Not Voted ranking. Isiolo, Samburu and Lamu (all 50/50 counties) had the lowest due to their low population.

    TOTAL VOTER LOSS

    Overall a total of 5.6 million Kenyans in the strongholds of the 2 top candidates, did not take part in the 2003 Elections, out of which 2 million were registered to vote but did not for various reasons (no one has done any research as to why registered voters do not vote on the actual voting day), 3.6 million did not register at all for various reasons including lack of identity cards but some choose not to do so (boycott?) or lack of interest (Facebook generation?). Maybe voting needs to be made mandatory as in Australia, Turkey and Belgium. The difference between the 2007 and 2013 voter registration was only 42,662!

    [table id=34 /]

    CORD’S share of this potential voter loss was 3.1 million, which grows to 3.6 million when you add half of the fifty/fifty counties (475,000). Jubilee share was 1.6 million which grows to 2 million when you add the fifty/fifty counties (475,000).
    Hence CORD had a potential voter loss of 1.5 million (Not Voted + Not Reg) more than Jubilee, which would have been enough to give Raila Odinga victory in the 2013 Presidential Elections, if most had registered and/or voted.

    © 2015 STAN OYUNGA

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    Election Petition 35 of 2008 215.71 KB 41 downloads

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      ROAD TO KENYA ELECTIONS 2017

      OVERVIEW OF THE KENYA ELECTION DATABASE VERSION 2.0

       

      The Kenya Election Database is a record of the ten General Elections and two Referendums held since independence in 1963 representing an aggregate of 107 million registered voters and 142 million valid votes cast in national elections and 15 million in the Referendums.

      The Kenya Election Database Version 2.0 is the latest version of the only Election Data Analysis and Strategic Election Planning software on Kenya General Elections. The Database is a collection of well researched and detailed analysis of all parliamentary elections since 1969, presidential elections since 1992, by-elections since 1993 and results of both 2005 and 2010 Referendums. It also has full results of the 2013 General Elections in respect of Presidential, Parliamentary, Senatorial, Gubernatorial and Women Representative elections. It is updated with results of all national by-elections since the 2013 General Elections. The Database has full results of 4,300 constituency and county elections covering 22,000 candidate results and is the only single source of full General Election results available in the market.

      The Database also includes details of all 210 old constituencies and the 290 new constituencies, created in 2012, including history, administrative area covered, population, land area, maps etc; details of the 1,450 county assembly wards; details of 180 political parties including the 60 officially registered parties, and their symbols; 2009 population census for all 8 old provinces, 47 counties, 158 districts, 635 divisions, 2,724 locations, 7,150 sub-locations; and 215 urban centers.

      The Database has the results of both the 1999 and 2009 Census, hence can also be used for social, marketing and consumer research. It also has 2015 and 2017 population projection for each Region (Province), County, Sub-County (District), Division, Location and Sub-location and also for each Constituency and Ward.

      The Database has details of registered voters from 1969 to December, 2012 and analysis of population vis-à-vis registered voters.

      A unique feature is the 2009 population census of Kenya’s 43 ethnic groups and 79 sub-ethnic groups, including each ethnic group’s estimated voters in 2017.

      The Database has details of all candidates who have ever stood in any General Election since 1969, including gender and status, i.e. incumbent, former winner, previous candidate or newcomer.

      The Database has over 650 reports some of which are unique to this Database, e.g. Constituency notes, Political party notes, Kenya election history, women candidates, etc. The database is the most comprehensive analysis of Kenya General Elections and has been well researched by competent professionals as given in the following menu:

       

        1. New Constituency and Election details [1969-2013].
        2. County and Election details [2013].
        3. Candidate Election results by New Constituency [1969-2013].
        4. Candidate Election results by County [2013].
        5. Presidential Election details [1992-2013].
        6. Presidential Election details-County Results [2013].
        7. New Constituency and County Assembly Ward details.
        8. New Constituency and Sub-location details.
        9. Old Constituency and Election details [1969-2007].
        10. Candidate Election results by Old Constituency [1969-2007].
        11. Political Party details.
        12. Province population census 1969 – 2009.
        13. Province/County/District/Division/Location/Sub-location census details. [1999 and 2009 Census].
        14. Local Authority and Urban Centre census details.
        15. Urban Centre census and status.
        16. Ethnic Group census details.
        17. Voter registration details [1969-2013].
        18. Preview and print Analytical reports [660 reports].

       

      The Database runs on Microsoft Access platform and can be down-loaded from a Drop Box link. Your PC or Laptop must have MS Access version 2002 or later versions already installed. It comes zipped hence must be unzipped and installed on your hard-drive. It is about 800MB in size. It costs only Kshs 2,000/= or 40 US Dollars for non-Kenya residents.

      For more details or to order, e-mail: systexsolutions@yahoo.com

      Or call: 0722751753

      © 2015 SYSTEX SOLUTIONS P O BOX 2523-00200 CITY SQ NAIROBI

      2013 Elections: Tyranny of Numbers – Fact or Myth?

      By Stan Oyunga (stanoyunga@yahoo.com)

      INTRODUCTION

      The 2013 General Election is still being referred to a two horse race, between CORD and the Jubilee Coalitions, the latter’s Presidential candidate won with 6.1 million votes against the former’s with 5.3 million votes.

      The difference between Uhuru Kenyatta (6,173,433) and Raila Odinga (5,340,546) was 832,887 which lent credence to the infamous “tyranny of numbers” debate on social media.

      The “tyranny of numbers” debate seemed to have correctly predicted that the Jubilee Coalition had already “won” the 2013 General Elections by 18th December, 2012, when the voter registration exercise ended. Areas perceived to be strongholds of Jubilee had registered significantly more voters than those perceived to be CORD strongholds. Another factor that gave Jubilee victory was the voter turn-out, which was higher in the latter’s strongholds then in the CORD strongholds.

      CORD was its own worst enemy by not ensuring most potential voters in its strongholds were registered as voters before 18th December, 2012 and that they also turned up to vote. But it will be noted from this analysis that CORD failed on both counts.

      With the 2017 General Elections only four years away, the question is: has CORD learnt a lesson and the “tyranny of numbers” can be reversed in its favour? Or will Jubilee continue with its organizational skill to ensure it wins a second term in 2017?

      VOTER REGISTRATION FACTOR

      Ever since the 1992 Presidential Elections, Kenyans have always voted on ethnic group lines with the exception of the 2002 Presidential Elections when the top two candidates were from the same ethnic group (Mwai Kibaki of NARC defeated Uhuru Kenyatta of Kanu with 62% of the national vote).

      The results of any Presidential Election will be determined by the votes of the top seven Ethnic groups: Kikuyu (6.2m), Luyha (5.3m), Kalenjin (4.9m), Luo (4m), Kamba (3.8m), Kisii (2.2m) and Meru (1.6m), who account for 75% (28.7 million) of Kenya’s population of 38 million as per the 2009 census.

      Although the Somali ethnic group was ranked 6th in population in the 2009 census with 2.3 million, this figure has been disputed as attested by North Eastern Region having only registered 347,457 voters in 2012, which is only 15% of the Region’s population. The average voter registration vis-à-vis the regional population is 40%.

      Using the Kenya Election Database Version 1.0, Kenya’s first and only election data analysis software, it is possible to confirm the potential voters/approx registered voters per ethnic group and per Coalition strongholds based on the 2009 census and 2012 voter registration.

      This is the first time that Kenya’s voters are being are categorised by ethnic group since the Independent Election and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) does not require voters to state their ethnic group. The software allocates constituencies and counties a main ethnic group which must comprise of 65% of the population of the constituency/county. Where the population is a mixture of ethnic groups then “cosmopolitan” is shown, e.g. Nairobi and Mombasa.

       

      [table id=25 /]

      From Table A, the Jubilee Coalition draws the majority of its support from the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Meru, Embu, Tharaka and Mbeere, whose potential voters number 5,566,465 and 2012 registered voters were approximately 5,193,111.

      From Table B, CORD draws the majority of its support from the Luhya, Luo/Basuba, Kamba, Kisii, Miji Kenda, Teso and Taita whose potential voters number 7,277,652 and 2012 registered voters were approximately 5,175,933.

      Table A and B clearly shows that while Jubilee managed to register 5.1 million (93%) out of their 5.5 million potential voters in their strongholds, CORD managed to register only 5.1 million (71%) out of 7.2 million potential voters.

      Table C shows ethnic groups where support for both Coalitions was mixed or fifty/fifty with total potential voters at 4.3 million and registered voters approximately 3.7 million.

      Table D (below) shows Kenya summary of potential and registered voters for Jubilee, Cord and Mixed (50/50) with potential voters at 17.2 million voters which is very close to the IEBC target of 18 million (which was actually overstated by 1 million due North Eastern region population mystery). Registered voters total 14.1 million which is very close to the actual IEBC total of 14.3 million registered in December, 2012.

      [table id=26 /]

      Table E (below) shows summary of registered voters as per Coalition strongholds plus 50% of mixed ethnic groups, hence giving Jubilee a total of 7,070,126 voters and CORD a total of 7,052,948 which was almost equal. Since the Amani coalition of Musalia Mudavadi took part of the Luhya ethnic group in the 2013 Presidential Elections, the CORD total was reduced by over 400,000 to be 6.6 million. The 5 other minor Presidential candidates only accounted for just over 200,000 votes, but mainly from protest and fringe voters.

      [table id=27 /]

      Hence before the 4th March 2013 Presidential Elections, Jubilee had 7 million registered voters compared with CORD with 6.6 million registered voters, hence the “tyranny of numbers”. But the difference between Jubilee and CORD was only 400,000 caused by the “Mudavadi” factor. Out of the 12.2 million voters who actually voted, 6.1 million voted for Jubilee, 5.3 million for CORD and 832,887 for other candidates.

      Table F (below) clearly shows that CORD had a voter potential of 9.4 million in its strongholds while Jubilee had 7.7 million, hence CORD failed to register 1.7 million potential voters, which would have reversed the “tyranny of numbers” and given them victory in the 2013 Presidential elections.

      [table id=28 /]

      NOT VOTED FACTOR

      In the 2013 General Elections, a total of 2,022,196 registered voters did not turn-up to vote, representing 14 % of all registered voters. If only 50 % of “no show voters” had turned up then the difference between the Jubilee and Cord candidates would have been narrower, hence forcing a run-off.

      The 10 counties with the most “no show” voters (having half of the 2 million) in the 2013 elections were:-

      1. Nairobi-318,138-Fifty/Fifty
      2. Mombasa-136,429-CORD
      3. Kilifi-117,958-CORD
      4. Kakamega-92,682-CORD/Amani
      5. Kiambu-80,093-Jubilee
      6. Nakuru-79,001-Jubilee
      7. Machakos-73,018-CORD
      8. Kisii-64,283-CORD
      9. Bungoma-59,457-CORD
      10. Meru-57,446-Jubilee

      It can be noted from above that out of the 10 counties with most “no show” voters, 6 were in CORD strongholds (over 540,000) and only 3 in Jubilee strongholds (over 200,000) with Nairobi being a fifty/fifty county (over 300,000). Since most “no show voters” were in counties considered CORD strongholds, it is very unlikely that the outcome of the 2013 Presidential elections would have changed even if there was a run-off.

      Table G (below) gives the Voter Registration and “Not Voted” breakdown per County, the main Ethnic group and Coalition stronghold or mixed counties.
      [table id=30 /]

      Table H below shows that out of the 2 million voters who did not vote in the 2013 Presidential Elections, 1.1 million were from Regions that were CORD strongholds, (Coast, Western, Nyanza and mixed support-North Eastern, Eastern and Nairobi); while 900,000 came from Jubilee strongholds, (Central, Rift Valley, and mixed support,-North Eastern, Eastern and Nairobi). The difference is only 200,000 but when you check the “Not Voted” percentage, the Coast region (CORD) had the highest with 29.88% and while Central region (Jubilee) had the lowest with 7.97%.
      [table id=31 /]

       

      CONCLUSION

      It can be noted from Table H that the “no show voters” were from both Coalition strongholds and even if half of the “no show voters” had turned up and voted, the outcome of the 2013 Presidential Elections would not have changed, but a run-off may have been necessary.

      CORD still has a chance of reversing the infamous “tryranny of numbers” by ensuring that most its 9.4 million potential voters in its strongholds and mixed support areas are registered well before the August, 2017 General Elections. The voting population is expected to grow with those who were 15 years old or above in 2013, becoming eligible to register as voters. It is estimated that about 22 million Kenyans will be eligible to register (40% of estimated adult population) and vote in 2017, out of which about 12 million will be from CORD strongholds and 10 million from Jubilee strongholds.

      Jubilee will need to make in-roads in perceived CORD strongholds such as Coast and Western regions if they hope to win re-election.